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Q : “What would you call yourself then? What
sort of label would best characterize your position?”
A: “I hesitate with my answer because such a label
may affect the perception and appreciation of what I
am saying in a negative way; if you are labelled you
are not seen.”

- Maturana, H. (2004) From Being to Doing: The
Origins of the Biology of Cognition, pg. 34.
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ABSTRACT
I examine stigma associated with schizophrenia and how psychiatric diagnosis, mental
health professionals, the criminal justice system, and society ostracize and contribute to the
suffering of approximately three million Americans. I doubt schizophrenia’s conceptualization as
a progressively deteriorating biological disease and present the social conditions that accumulate
stress for the individual and lead to psychotic episodes. I argue that schizophrenia cannot be
understood as a “thing,” but as a complex system of numerous variables contributing to a system
of disorder resulting from prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory social-structural conditions, and
unjust treatment of human beings needing extra resources to thrive. Ultimately, I present
discrimination of people with psychological disorder as a human rights issue, parallel to the
neurodiversity movement to normalize autism as existing in the greater variation of human
neurodevelopment. People with psychotic symptoms do not need to be “cured;” they do need
acceptance, assistance, and resources to thrive alongside their family, friends, and the greater
society. I infer necessary radical structural change to diagnostics, treatment, and the criminal
justice system to unravel structural discrimination. I hypothesize reducing stigma by an
intermediate practical suggestion of eradicating the label “schizophrenia” from our language as
stigmatizing. I will draw upon 15 years of promising evidence of moderate reduction in social
attitudes following Japan’s renaming of schizophrenia (“mind-split disease”) to “integration
disorder.”
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WHAT IS SCHIZOPHRENIA?
The short answer is nobody knows. A remarkable statement when illuminated by the fact
that schizophrenia (SCZ) has the longest history of any formal classification of psychological
disorder and became the foundation on which all psychiatric diagnoses are conceptualized.
Described by Crow (2008) as “the disease1 of humanity” since SCZ may have evolved with
language, is largely associated with socio-cultural and interpersonal stress, and is difficult to
research with animal models. A search for “schizophrenia” in the Academic Search Premiere
database brings up nearly 62,000 results since 1956. Indeed, there are many more pages of words
since SCZ was first systematically described in the 1890s by Emil Kraepelin as “dementia
praecox” before being renamed “schizophrenia” by Eugen Bleuler in 1908. Hypotheses of SCZ’s
cause(s), refinement of symptom descriptions, and lists of associations from neuroimaging and
genetic research have been further catalogued over the last century.
However, identifying symptoms and giving something a name only provides the illusion
that SCZ is understood. It is not known what causes approximately 1% of the world’s population
to experience the symptoms associated with SCZ. Manifestations of the condition are so
heterogeneous (highly variable) that most researchers doubt all cases of SCZ result from the
same underlying neurobiological process; Tandon, Nasrallah, and Keshavan (2011) believe it
likely that SCZ is a “meta-syndrome” with no one cause to account for the extreme diversity.

1

The term “disease” is often used by the public, media, and in the literature to describe SCZ. However,
this term is defined in Hyman (2010) as: “Disease: generally used to describe a medical condition or
abnormality conferring harm or risk of harm in which etiology or pathologic processes (pathophysiology)
are known.” They differentiate “disorder” as the term to describe when these variables are unknown.
Therefore, “disease” is not an accurate description of SCZ.
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They claim that this heterogeneity should not be considered a sign of failed research, but as the
key question to focus future research.
Though it is common for people to not exhibit obvious behaviors—to have their first
psychotic episode—until early adulthood, evidence suggests underlying neurobiological
processes contributing to a susceptibility of psychotic symptoms begin prenatally (Catts et al.,
2013). There is no “cure” for SCZ, only a long history of coerced or forced treatment with
unpleasant “antipsychotic” medication to quell some symptoms and control patients through
heavy sedation. Unfortunately, there have been no major advancements in medication for SCZ
since the 1950s, apart from some lessening of side-effects.
Kraepelin first described SCZ as an unrelenting progressive deterioration of cognition,
which he differentiated from the better outcomes of bipolar disorder (Harding & Zahniser, 1994).
Later in his life, Kraepelin changed his mind about SCZ being necessarily progressive as most
people show some remission and leveling of symptoms over time. However, this sense of
prognostic hopelessness has prevailed to this day. Receiving a diagnosis of SCZ remains a social
death sentence, which probably explains why suicide rates are higher than any other diagnosis
and SCZ is considered one of the top ten leading causes of disease-related disability in the world
(Tandon, Keshavan, & Nasrallah, 2008).
The historical account of how people diagnosed with SCZ have been treated is a human
rights nightmare—horrifying, shameful, and largely existing under the radar of most people’s
awareness. At different times, patients have been isolated and/or rejected from their families,
tortured, restrained, sterilized, lobotomized, shocked with strong electric currents, and even put
on display for gawkers in zoo-like settings (Frances, 2013; Harman, 2003). Most often, this
population has been left to rot in deplorable conditions, which continues today manifesting as
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below poverty living conditions, homelessness, or imprisonment. Unlike abundant media
portrayals over the last couple decades of quirky and endearing people or fictional characters
with autism, OCD, or depression, there are very few positive media portrayals of people with
symptoms of SCZ.2 Most often they are represented as dangerous and unpredictable and require
restraint for the good of society (Wahl, 1995). No other psychiatric diagnosis shares the level of
persistent negative stigma as SCZ (Corrigan & Bink, 2016).

How is schizophrenia classified and diagnosed?
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) was
released in 2013 with only minor changes from the previous edition, DSM-IV-TR (2000). Both
editions list five characteristic symptoms of SCZ. The previous edition required observation of
two out of the five symptoms for a duration of one-month. The updated DSM-5 groups three of
the five symptoms as core positive symptoms diagnosed with high reliability: 1) delusions; 2)
hallucinations; 3) disorganized speech. DSM-5 requires at least one of the two observed
symptoms required for diagnosis to be among these three positive symptoms. The other two
characteristic symptoms are: 4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior; 5) negative symptoms
(i.e., diminished emotional expression or avolition). To receive a diagnosis of SCZ, the person
must exhibit continuous signs of disturbance for at least six months, including social and/or
occupational dysfunction (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The DSM-5 absorbed SCZ as one of a spectrum of psychotic disorders along with
catatonia, schizotypal disorder, and schizophreniform disorder. Previous editions of the DSM
attempted to explain the heterogeneity of SCZ with five subtypes, but as Tandon et al. (2013)

2

The portrayal of mathematician John Nash in A Beautiful Mind (Grazer, 2001) is a rare exception.
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explain, these subtypes were recognized as having poor reliability, low stability over time, and
negligible prognostic value well before the DSM-IV was authored. The DSM task force found
these subtypes to explain little and were rarely used by clinicians in actual diagnosis, and claim
these subtypes were only retained in DSM-IV “because of the substantial clinical tradition” (p.6).

What is the harm of categorical approaches to classifying psychiatric
diagnoses?
Among the great debates of the field of psychology is the validity of diagnosing disorder
based on the categorical approach of counting behaviors and the persistence of reported
symptoms over a certain amount of time to determine the presence of one of the hundreds of
disorders listed in the DSM (Paris, 2013). DSM categorization describes the typicality of a
disorder to which clinicians are expected to compare to their patient to determine a diagnosis. By
definition, categories have boundaries which can appear distinct on paper, but are fuzzy and open
to interpretation. If SCZ requires two of five typical symptoms for a duration of one month, does
that mean a client does not require treatment if they show multiple symptoms for only 29 days?
Also, if one person has all five symptoms and another has only two, is it valid to claim they have
the same disorder?
As Paris (2013) explains based on research in cognitive psychology, people prefer to
think in categories and are uncomfortable with ambiguity because it is demanding on cognitive
energy. The creators of the DSM valued interrater reliability—the likelihood that separate
clinicians will identify the same category based on observing the same set of symptoms—which
allowed the validity of disorders to take a back seat to reliability. As a result, DSM categorization
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is useful for research and clinician communication. However, the DSM3 has become the bridge
between psychiatry and the legal system, health insurance, treatment, and other systems critical
to each person’s “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” (U.S., 1776). Therefore, the DSM’s lack
of validity has dire consequences which are simply unacceptable in a society that espouses the
value of universal equality.
It does makes sense to classify medical conditions with known causes and pathology into
categories. As Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) explain, biomedical diagnoses are based on
their underlying cause, not subjectively reported symptoms. This is largely because in many
cases, separate biological maladies can present similar symptoms. Therefore, diagnosing a
disease based on symptoms can lead to false positive identification and misdirected treatment.
As there are no known biological tests for psychological disorder, classifying it in the
same way as medical diseases only obscures their causes and leads to reification4 (Hyman,
2010). Colignon (1989) defines reification as “the error of regarding an abstraction as a real
phenomenon” (p.83). They explain that psychological disorder consists of a highly complex
interaction of biological, psychological, and socio-cultural factors and its mechanisms and
biological development are not clearly understood. To classify disorder in a clinically useful way
and communicate to a wide audience, it is deemed necessary to simplify the complex
phenomenon into constructs with names and lists of behaviors. Reification is the result of these
reductions of complex phenomenon leading people to believe diagnostic classification is an
accurate and complete understanding of the construct when they were intended to be heuristics

3

Introductory psychology students are often presented the DSM as the “Bible of psychiatry” which is
misleading and indoctrinating for a book better described as the “Bible of insurance and pharmaceutical
companies.”
4
John Stuart Mill wrote, “The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever received a name
must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own.” (qtd. in Hyman, 2010)
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(practical and efficient short cut placeholders to communicate about complex phenomenon). The
reification of diagnostic classification leads to overconfidence that diagnoses such as SCZ clearly
describe well-understood diseases. As Tandon et al. (2013) explain, the DSM-5 task force
originally intended to incorporate neurobiological measures and genomic information into the
DSM to support diagnoses. However, this aspiration failed as results from neuroscience and
genetics research have only generated interesting hypotheses and correlations. Ultimately, the
DSM-5 task force found insufficient evidence to incorporate biological and genetic evidence
beyond noting speculative findings.
Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) point to 1980 as a turning point in psychiatric diagnosis
with the creation of DSM-III. They claim that mental health professionals made a deliberate
political choice of adopting the “language of medicine” to understand psychological disorder
(e.g., disease, relapse, prognosis, etc.) (p.80). Psychiatry wanted to be taken seriously as a
medical specialty and began focusing more on discovering the biological causes of disorders,
perhaps because this framework is more compatible with pharmaceutical treatments.
Unfortunately, this move to medicalize psychological disorder resulted in less emphasis on the
unique individual’s personal history and social and cultural contexts. In other words,
psychiatrists deliberately deemphasized the psychosocial contributions to disorder. This change
was not due to scientific evidence, nor has it led to important scientific discoveries about the
etiology of psychological disorder. In addition to reification, Frances (2013) explains this
approach has led to “diagnostic inflation,” over diagnosis and over treatment.
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Could dimensional approaches to diagnosis replace categorical?
Categories are dichotomous, which in the case of diagnosis means someone either has or
doesn’t have the disorder. Since categories are predetermined, they fail to account for the
variability between unique individuals or how experiences with the same diagnosis could
significantly differ between people. Particularly in the case of SCZ, categorical classification
does not account for the wide heterogeneity where any number of those diagnosed could have
widely different symptom profiles. According to Paris (2013), classifying phenomena along a
continuum is far preferable for quantifying the degree to which traits exist. Dimensional
approaches to classification dissolve the boundary between disorder and normality rather than
placing someone in an either/or category. As Heckers et al. (2013) clarify, categorical diagnosis
contributes to the lack of progress in finding the mechanism (biological cause) of SCZ.
Particularly since it’s likely that SCZ does not have a single cause or is a single disease (Paris,
2013; Tandon et al., 2013).
Both dimensional and categorical approaches to diagnosis are inadequate as they do not
account for the complexity of mental processes. As Paris (2013) explains, “mind is an emergent
property of the brain and cannot be fully explained on a cellular or molecular level” (p.75).
Trying to medicalize and reduce disorder as “brain diseases” misses many levels of analysis,
such as psychological, social/cultural, and other contexts that help explain the individual’s
experience and how best to help them. Paris (2013) concludes that a valid dimensional scale
cannot be added to the current system; a new system would have to be recreated around this goal,
which clearly isn’t happening any time soon.
Therefore, to remain practical for clinical use, DSM-5 maintained the categorical
approach with an added attempt to account for variability and flexibility by recognizing
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dimensional aspects. They emphasized the domains of psychopathology—hallucinations,
delusions, disorganized thought, disorganized or abnormal motor behavior (including catatonia),
and negative symptoms—as well as dimensions and gradients of psychosis. In other words,
disorder severity can be defined by the level, number, and duration of the signs and symptoms
(Heckers et al., 2013). However, without any formal way to quantify these dimensions and
gradients, it remains to be seen whether this addition has practical utility.

What are the behaviors and symptoms associated with schizophrenia?
In a series of papers providing “just the facts” of SCZ (Tandon et al., 2008, 2009, 2010,
2011; Keshavan et al., 2008a, 2008b) give an overview of the major research findings of SCZ
including nosology, neuroscience, genetics, treatment, as well as to speculate on future directions
of inquiry. SCZ includes a wide range of behavior considered abnormal divided into categories
(or “domains”), each of which has a great deal of variability from person to person. Positive,
negative, and cognitive symptoms characterize the disorder, and each symptom can range from
absent to present, slight to severe, and intermittent to chronic. To complicate matters, there is
considerable overlap of symptoms with other conditions—particularly bipolar disorder. Mood
and cognitive difficulties are also common as is comorbid depression, anxiety, and substance
abuse disorders.
Positive symptoms are behaviors not typically present or pervasive in the rest of the
population. These symptoms are often described as “impaired reality testing” or “losing touch”
with some aspect of reality (National Institute of Mental Health, n.d.; Tandon et al., 2009)
Positive symptoms can range from benign and subtle to fantastical and incoherent to other
people. The client must exhibit at least one of the positive symptom domains to be diagnosed
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with SCZ: Delusions are defined as “fixed beliefs that are not amendable to change in light of
conflicting evidence” (APA, 2013). There are many different themes of delusion and the most
common in SCZ are of a persecutory nature, such as believing that other individuals,
organizations, or groups intend to harm or harass the believer. Delusions are considered
“bizarre” when they express a loss of control over one’s mind or body, such as believing one’s
thoughts have been removed or inserted by an outside force (thought withdrawal/thought
insertion), or that one’s body or behavior is being externally manipulated (delusions of control).
Hallucinations are perceptual experiences without external stimulus which can occur in any of
the senses, though auditory hallucinations are most common to SCZ (Tandon et al., 2009). A
person may hear one or even many voices—there is a great deal of variability—but the voice(s)
may comment on, or make commands on the person’s behavior. Disorganized thinking is
usually inferred through unusual speech such as jumping from topic to topic (tangentiality),
using language and syntax in a way incoherent to others (“word salad”), or answering questions
in a manner unrelated or only loosely related to the questions (loose associations). Antipsychotic
drugs block dopamine receptors and help quell many people’s positive symptoms and so it is
generally believed, but unproven, that excess dopamine causes delusions and hallucinations.
Negative symptoms relate to an absence or blunting of behavior that is typically present in
most people. Particularly prominent in SCZ is diminished emotional expression and avolition—a
loss of motivation/initiative. Many of the negative symptoms overlap with major depression and
autism. The underlying neurobiological mechanisms of negative symptoms are not well
understood, are difficult to treat, and are considered the most debilitating component of SCZ
(Tandon et al., 2009).
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One issue with how positive and negative symptoms interact is that a person may be
treated with antipsychotics and show a remission of positive symptoms while concurrently
becoming increasingly socially isolated and unmotivated (negative symptoms). Positive
symptom abatement combined with loss of motivation can in turn effect drug adherence and
resource seeking which can result in a relapse of psychotic symptoms. This cycle generates a
pattern that contributes to the belief that SCZ is necessarily an enduring, progressive, and
hopelessly debilitating “disease.”
Mood symptoms typically appear years ahead of the onset of psychotic symptoms, but are
often missed as an early warning sign. These symptoms usually appear in late adolescence and
early adulthood when it’s not unusual for a person to be moody. Depression is very common in
SCZ and more severe in those who struggle with alcohol or drug use. Overall, mood symptoms
take a large toll on this community and contribute to withdrawal and social isolation (Tandon et
al., 2009).
Though neither motor nor cognition symptoms are universally present in this population,
these symptoms are highly associated with SCZ. A reduction of psychomotor activity is
common, though paradoxically, excessive motor activity often accompanies a florid phase of
positive symptoms. Catatonia, or motor and/or behavior immobility, is usually associated with
more severe illness (Tandon et al., 2009). Catatonia and motor symptoms can also be induced by
the original antipsychotics such as chlorpromazine widely prescribed in the 1950s–1970s, which
were used largely to quell hallucinations and delusions and to pacify patients in state hospitals.
Cognitive impairment tends to be generalized but specific common impairments include episodic
memory, processing speed, verbal fluency, attention, executive function, and working memory
(Tandon et al., 2009). Cognitive impairment is also a strong predictor of poor social and
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vocational outcome, particularly with impairments of social cognition. There is a great deal of
overlap of cognitive symptoms seen in SCZ with many affective disorders.
Tandon, Keshavan, and Nasrallah (2008) also list the many co-occurring factors that
contribute to high mortality and the “disease burden” of SCZ. Among this population is a higher
occurrence of obesity and cardiovascular disease. Alcohol, nicotine, and cannabis abuse are very
common and contribute to heightened impairment, worsening of psychotic symptoms, and
blunting of antipsychotic effectiveness. People with symptoms of SCZ are five times more likely
to smoke cigarettes than the general population and smoking greatly contributes to health
problems. Over the last ten years, there has been a great deal of research focused on cannabis use
as a risk factor as it seems to be associated with an earlier onset of disorder. Another common
factor that contributes to disease burden listed in Tandon, Keshavan, and Nasrallah’s (2009)
review is the prevalence of anxiety disorders in the early phases of illness. Comorbid substance
use disorders are frequent and correlated with the more violent and unpredictable behavior that
stereotype SCZ. Many people experiencing psychotic symptoms lack insight that they have a
disorder, which means they believe treatment is unnecessary for them. Others may acknowledge
their symptoms, but misattribute them to other causes. As would be expected, lack of insight,
anxiety, and substance use have a large effect on seeking resources and adhering to treatment.
Tandon et al. (2009) explain how mortality among those diagnosed with SCZ is
considerably different than the typical population and has worsened since the 1990s. A third of
this population attempt suicide at least once and 5% of individuals with symptoms of SCZ
terminate their own lives. Suicide completion rates are responsible for the larger excess deaths
among males with schizophrenic symptoms. Family support and social connectedness seem to
protect against suicide, whereas coexisting mood and motor symptoms, substance abuse, poor
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treatment adherence, akathisia (severe restlessness), and impulsivity are the main factors
associated with greater suicide risk. Overall, cardiovascular disease (from smoking, obesity, and
other lifestyle factors) is responsible for the largest number of excess deaths, and takes a larger
toll on women diagnosed with SCZ. There is also a 10% higher risk of accidents among people
exhibiting psychotic symptoms. Overall, lifespan among this population is approximately 15–20
years less than the general population.
A vast majority of people with schizophrenic symptoms are not violent, though violent
behavior is highly associated with the stereotype of SCZ. As Tandon et al. (2009) report, people
with symptoms of SCZ are far more likely to be victims of violence. When violent behavior does
occur, it is usually in conjunction with severe positive symptoms (e.g. paranoid delusions),
comorbid substance use, impulsivity, or comorbid psychopathy or other personality disorders.

What is the epidemiology of schizophrenia?
Tandon et al. (2009) report SCZ as one of the most disabling of all psychiatric disorders.
SCZ is estimated to affect approximately 4.5 people per population of 1000, or around .7% of all
people at some point during their lifetime. The incidence is consistent worldwide, however
several demographic factors appear to increase risk. These factors may be connected to the
person’s degree of social stress and social connectedness, including urban birth and upbringing.
Migration, a factor connected to social adversity, also seems to increase risk of developing
psychotic symptoms, particularly when the person migrated from a country with a predominately
Black population to one that is predominately White. Unsurprisingly, a higher prevalence of SCZ
is found among people of lower socio-economic classes. Other environmental factors associated
with higher risk are being born in the winter/spring, prenatal infection and famine, and cannabis
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abuse during adolescence. Older paternal age seems to double the risk. In the U.S., males are
about 1.4 times more likely to develop SCZ than women. Interestingly, this male to female
difference is not found in developing countries.
Tandon et al. (2009) depict how quality of life is greatly diminished in SCZ and a
diagnosis significantly increases the likelihood of unemployment and homelessness. Less than
one-fifth of people with symptoms of SCZ are fully employed. Two-thirds have never been
married and most suffer from reduced contact with family and have few friends. Families of
those with psychotic symptoms report a higher burden than other psychiatric disorders, along
with lower support from their social network and professionals. There is also a substantial
societal cost to SCZ by way of reduced productivity, homelessness, skyrocketing incarceration
rates and high comorbid medical and substance abuse problems.
Tandon et al. (2009) describe the onset of course in SCZ. Just as categorical boundaries
are fuzzy, so are the boundaries between the phases, or stages, of SCZ. During early
development, before the condition would be recognized, is considered the premorbid phase.
Delays can occur in motor development and deficits in attention and academic achievement are
common, as are social isolation and emotional detachment. These premorbid phase behaviors
often go unnoticed, or are only associated with SCZ in retrospect.
The prodromal phase is the period leading to the first onset of a psychotic episode
(Tandon et al., 2009). This stage can last anywhere from months to years, though the mean is
approximately five years. This phase is characterized by the beginning swell of cognitive,
negative, and depressive symptoms and ends with approximately a year of early accumulation of
positive symptoms until entering a full psychotic phase.
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The psychotic phase is not inevitable as only about 1/6–1/2 of people who seek
treatment during the prodromal phase go on to develop SCZ (Tandon et al., 2009). Substance
abuse and life stressors are believed to precipitate the first episode, though determining specific
triggers is difficult in most cases. The first psychotic episode is characterized by florid delusions
and hallucinations as well as a worsening of the other symptoms. Onset age has a large range of
15- to 45-years-old with a peak during 18–30 years-old. For unknown reasons, first psychotic
episodes tend to occur in males on average of 5–7 years earlier than females. Women also tend to
have better premorbid functioning, lower completed suicide rates, respond better to treatment,
and have a better overall prognosis than men. Whether these variances are due to neurobiological
differences between gender or social-cultural reasons is unclear and is likely a complex
interaction of all of these factors.
The stable phase follows the psychotic phase, though the name is highly misleading as
this stage is grossly variable for different individuals (Tandon et al., 2009). SCZ is classically
characterized as a chronic series of exacerbations and remissions of psychotic symptoms.
However, psychotic outbreaks seem to usually be triggered by stress, nonadherence to treatment,
or substance abuse. Over the long term, positive symptoms tend to lessen and negative symptoms
tend to increase in severity. Overall, around a quarter of people diagnosed with SCZ show full
psychopathological remission and half show social remission. Deterioration beyond the
psychotic phase seems to be associated with the duration of untreated psychotic symptoms.
Therefore, people with adequate resources to begin treatment early have a higher likelihood to
reach a plateau and stabilize, or even resolve completely.
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What has neuroscience and genetics research contributed to the
understanding of schizophrenia?
Tandon et al. (2008) explain that though two-thirds of cases occur sporadically, SCZ is
understood to have a strong heritable genetic component. Having a family member that
experiences psychotic symptoms does increase risk. However, genetics research has identified
approximately 4000 genes linked to SCZ—approximately 20% of the 19-20 thousand genes in
the human genome. There does not appear to be a major gene locus that could explain
heritability or predict who will develop SCZ and many promising initial findings have not
replicated in subsequent studies.
Like genetics research, many correlations have been discovered in neuroscience research,
all of which overlap with other disorders and it is hard to know which findings are worth
pursuing to specifically elucidate differences in neural development between people who
experience psychotic symptoms. A few of the twenty(!) most robust findings listed in Keshavan
et al. (2008b) follow: Less overall brain volume; an increased volume of the ventricles; a
reduction of neurons in the hippocampus; a reduction (and sometimes a reversal) of the usual
cerebral asymmetry; structural alterations in white matter tracts which are essential to
“communication” between neurons. Other findings, such as an increase in basal ganglia volume,
may be directly related to taking antipsychotics.
It is difficult to discern direction of causality when it comes to findings from
neuroimaging. Does a lesser brain volume contribute to causing the behaviors associated with
SCZ… or do the behaviors somehow cause a shrink in volume… or is the person simply born
with an atypical ratio of gray matter to ventricle space? Chronic stress, as evidenced by raised
cortisol levels, is known to affect gray matter volumes in the hippocampus and cortisol has been
shown to be elevated immediately preceding psychotic episodes (Keshavan et al., 2008b).
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Overall, attempting to study SCZ based on neurobiological and genetics findings seem to
be dead-ends that may or may not resolve with advancements in future technology. However,
since the medical model dominates, a large majority of research funding is directed toward this
type of research rather than investing in psychosocial interventions to help people cope with
symptoms (Frances, 2013).

What are the treatments for schizophrenia?
Tandon, Nasrallah, and Keshavan (2010) review treatments and outcomes of people with
symptoms of SCZ. Prior to the accidental discovery of what became known as antipsychotic
medication in the 1950s, treatment mostly consisted of isolating the patients in mental hospitals
to protect themselves and society. Other treatments offer fodder for horror films such as
submerging all but the head of the patient in a freezing cold bathtub, sensory deprivation,
electroconvulsive therapy, insulin coma therapy, and prefrontal leucotomy. Interestingly, the
outcome of SCZ is better in non-Western countries. Since the 1950s, over 60 antipsychotics have
been developed, all of which block the dopamine D-2 receptor, only reduce positive symptoms,
and are only moderately effective. Antipsychotics have a great deal of unpleasant and variable
side-effects such as sedation, hypotension, irregular heartbeat, sexual dysfunction, and disrupting
acetylcholine transmission which can have a wide range of effects on the central and peripheral
nervous system.
As Tandon et al. (2010) further explain, pharmacotherapy alone has little impact on
negative symptoms, cognitive and social functioning, quality of life, and does not reduce the
likelihood of suicide and risk of relapse. However, psychosocial therapies do help all these
problems. Therefore, those who receive and adhere to antipsychotic medication and psychosocial
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therapy fare the best in the long run. Particularly helpful interventions include family members to
reduce high expressed emotion—critical, hostile, and emotionally over-involved attitudes among
relatives. The effect sizes of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) have been inconsistent across
studies, yet seem to confirm that CBT can be effective in coping with positive symptoms. CBT
does require a necessary degree of insight, as it works by reframing delusions and hallucinations
as misinterpretations and irrational attributions. Cognitive remediation approaches can
compensate for impaired cognition by using aids such as reminders and prompts to enhance
executive and social functioning. More research is needed, but social skills training has shown
promise for improving day-to-day living skills such as self-care, basic conversation, vocational
skills, and recreation. Assertive community treatment (ACT) consists of outreach by mental
health professionals to help patients in the community with low avolition. ACT has been found
to reduce hospitalizations and improve housing stability. Supported employment helps place
people in jobs that meet their abilities and offer ongoing assistance and seems effective in
helping patients find and maintain employment, though more long-term studies are needed.
Unfortunately, all these methods are under-utilized.

What is the evidence that CBT benefits people with psychotic symptoms?
Psychiatrists are generally pessimistic about using psychotherapy for treating psychotic
symptoms and emphasis is placed on using antipsychotic medications, which only address
positive symptoms. Largely, antipsychotic medications pacify patients rather than empower and
teach skills to cope with their cognitive challenges. However, this pessimism does not reflect the
otherwise optimistic research literature on CBT for psychotic disorders.
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Corrigan and Calabrese (2005) explain CBT assists the client to identify distressing
cognitions (such as auditory hallucinations and delusions) and reframe them as beliefs and to
seek less distressing interpretations. Drury, Birchwood, Cochrane, and Macmillian (1996) found
a marked decline in positive symptoms in their study of CBT for psychosis—only five percent of
their sample showed residual symptoms nine-months after therapy, as compared to the persistent
symptoms of greater than half their control group. A 2001 meta-analysis by Gould, Mueser,
Bolton, Mays, and Goff (as cited in Corrigan & Calabrese, 2005, p.248) found CBT to be a
promising strategy for decreasing severity of psychotic symptoms with an effect size of 0.65
across seven controlled studies.
Kingdon and Turkington (1991, 1994) describe a form of CBT that incorporates research
by Strauss (1969) showing that delusions and hallucinations are not discrete events but exist on a
continuum from minor to grand. These continua can be expanded further, for example to include
hallucinations from typical human states such as sleep deprivation or ingesting psychedelic
drugs. This spectra assumption allows more accurate assessment of magnitude and degree of
symptoms. It also normalizes troubling perceptions and beliefs for those in therapy by
understanding their psychotic experiences are not alien to the spectra of human experiences.
Examples of this reframing include appreciation that hallucinations can occur naturally during
sensory deprivation states and delusional beliefs can include astrology, as well as religious
beliefs. In CBT distressing symptoms are framed as protective behavioral responses to stress on
the individual rather than as manifestations of a “brain disease.” Their series of studies show
significant reductions in positive and negative symptoms and depression at a nine-month followup compared to a control group that was treated with a non-directive technique called
“befriending.” The cognitive therapy group also had shorter periods of hospitalization during the
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follow-up and no suicides or homicides over a 7-year period (Kingdon & Turkington, 1991;
Turkington & Kingdon, 2000).

What are the barriers to treatment for schizophrenia?
According to Tandon et al. (2010), a large majority of patients do not currently receive
evidence-based treatments that could improve their quality of life and reduce their disability.
There might simply be too much reductionist research on SCZ without enough interdisciplinary
analysis of the big picture. Neuroscientists and geneticists tend to specialize on a small target of
examination with great intensity. A neuroscientist could easily spend their entire career studying
a single module or network of the brain. This level of detail is important to scientific discovery,
especially as there are so many mysteries to be uncovered in the brain. Neuroimaging techniques
are evolving rapidly. However, they are currently coarse and crude.
Critical psychologists Fox, Prilleltensky, and Austin (2009) also point to psychology’s
focus on the individual, rather than considering a person’s behavior in its cultural and societal
contexts. This individualistic perspective has many faults. First, this perspective makes it too
easy to ignore the roles of structural inequality and oppression in contributing to the stress that
makes people vulnerable to psychological disorder. Focusing on the individual overemphasizes
individualistic values such as autonomy and self-actualization. Sloan (2009) adds that this
perspective diverts attention from seeking collective solutions. Their view is that the dichotomy
between “individual” and “social” is an illusion and imply that both should be understood as
indistinguishably intertwined. Furthermore, the individualistic perspective tends to blame the
individual for their shortcomings rather than focusing on the role of social inequality.5

5

See p.36 for discussion of the just world hypothesis.
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Furthermore, they critique psychology’s “fragmentation and overspecialization6” (Fox,
Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009, p.4). Professionals are expected to narrow their research to
reductionist questions with limited variables that can be operationalized and examined with
statistics. Certainly, specialists are important to all fields of inquiry, however these researchers
warn that rampant hyper-focus reduces exposure to adjacent fields that critique the status quo,
such as political theory, sociology, and anthropology.
What is sorely needed are more translational neuroscientists, PhD level scholars that
build bridges between medical discovery and clinical application (The University of Chicago,
2017). Ideally, these professionals should not supplement their income with gifts and grants from
the pharmaceutical industry to remain as ethically neutral as possible. Translational
neuroscientists should work with mental health professionals—psychologists, counselors, social
workers, and psychiatrists—applying existing knowledge of the brain to enhance nonpharmacological treatment modalities that are relatively easy to apply at all phases of SCZ,7 from
early prevention of psychotic episodes to later symptom coping skills.
There also needs to be a shift away from one-size-fits-all treatment approaches to
personalized therapy that honors the unique individual’s needs (Tandon et al., 2010). Those
struggling with mental illness should not be treated as if they have a localized brain disease, but
rather as a complex bio-psycho-social system embedded within an exponentially complex
political-social-cultural system. Individualized treatment may require multiple modalities to
address many levels of disability. Attention should be paid particularly to the client’s social
systems, coping skills, and stress levels as these seem to be the triggers of psychotic episodes.

6

See also: reductionism: The assumption that a complex idea can be understood in terms of its simpler
parts or components.
7
Referred to in Tandon et al. (2010) as “phase-specific treatment strategies.”
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Another major barrier to improving treatment for SCZ are the conceptual blinders around
the eyes of pharmaceutical researchers as they continue to focus on dopamine D-2 antagonism.
Excess dopamine, also known as the “dopamine hypothesis,” is one of the oldest proposed
theories of SCZ primarily because dopamine is the target of antipsychotic medication. Though
the dopamine hypothesis is prominent in the popular understanding of SCZ, researchers conclude
that evidence is sparse for a dopamine imbalance causing SCZ. Deacon (2013) refer to the
current research development approach as looking for a pharmacological “magic bullet” – a pill
targeting D-2 that will “cure” SCZ. This stubborn approach, nearly 70 years since the first
antipsychotics were accidentally discovered, continues despite very little advancement.
Meanwhile, there is little evidence that adjusting dopamine levels will help more than the
positive symptoms associated with SCZ. However, since D-2 targets have been shown to reduce
positive symptoms, it is much easier and profitable to make slight adjustments in the formula of
existing drugs and rebrand them as having less unpleasant side effects than the previous drug.
The pharmaceutical focus on dopamine antagonists is emblematic of a deeper problem,
which is the influence and power that drug companies have been handed in the mental health
industry. Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) explain how the U.S. is one of two countries that
allow direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. Commercials during popular
television shows and full-page advertisements in magazines have accelerated the public’s belief
that psychological disorders are primarily biologically based and can be easily remedied with a
pill. They reinforce the unproven construct that depression, anxiety, and psychotic behaviors are
due to neurochemical imbalances.8 Pharmaceutical companies have been embraced by the APA,

8

The idea of “chemical imbalances” is essentially the modern version of ancient Greek physician
Hippocrates’s theory that medical and psychological disorders are rooted in an imbalance of bodily fluids,
called “humors.” This belief dominated Western thinking from approximately 400 B.C. until the 17th
century.
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allowed to sponsor events at psychiatric conferences, and grant a large amount of medical
research. This has an impact on what conditions are prioritized for pharmaceutical research,
which is in turn impacted by which drugs are the most marketable to the public (e.g., drugs to
improve the sex drives of men and antidepressants). The medicalization of psychological
disorder has obscured the field by treating people as biological machines needing their
neurotransmitters recalibrated instead of looking at the social and environmental stressors that
contribute to an individual’s suffering or their inability to cope in an oppressive system.
Dead-ends in scientific research, inadequate pharmacological treatments, nuance-free
categorical approaches to diagnosis, and lack of interdisciplinary analysis are specific problems
under the larger umbrella of structural discrimination.9 Slapping a fresh coat of paint on a
fundamentally broken system will not improve people’s lives in a significant way. The system
would need to be discarded and built fresh, which is not realistic to suggest in a system so
entrenched in a hierarchy that keeps its metaphorical boots firmly on the throat of the mentally
ill. The power structures are not motivated to help these people, especially when those most
affected are stereotyped as dangerous criminals and of lower socio-economic status, minorities,
and immigrants. Without support, these people fill the spaces underneath urban bridges like firstworld refugee camps, or rot in our growing private prison populations to benefit CEOs and
stockholders.

9

See p.46 for discussion of structural discrimination.
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Should the concept of schizophrenia be dumped as invalid or reconceptualized to fit updated scientific discovery?
There are many hypotheses about what should be done to improve our understanding of
the concept currently known as SCZ. Some researchers believe the existing construct impedes
scientific research due to its lack of a cohesive and integrated model that incorporates the known
facts of SCZ (Keshavan, Nasrallah, & Tandon, 2011). SCZ contains extreme heterogeneity in
clinical expression, modest treatment effectiveness, and overlap of symptoms with numerous
other disorders; labeling all of these people as having the same disorder seems to impede
narrowing in on underlying causes or effective treatments. On the other hand, as Tandon et al.
(2009) also explain, a diagnosis of SCZ does characterize a clinical profile with typical patterns,
research supporting associated symptoms, neurobiological abnormalities, and responsiveness to
antipsychotic medication. Also, the concept of SCZ is similar worldwide with one of the highest
inter-rater diagnostic reliabilities of any psychiatric diagnoses.
One proposal to be further explored in this paper is to keep the general concept, but to
simply replace the label. The focus of this proposition is to disassociate the word
“schizophrenia” from its pervasive negative stereotypes. However, as Tandon et al. (2009)
caution, many researchers are skeptical of this proposal, believing research should stay focused
on discovering the underlying genetic and neurobiological underpinnings of SCZ rather than
getting caught up in “political correctness” and terminology. There is a reasonable concern that
changing the name could be interpreted by the public as signaling a substantial discovery of a
fundamental truth about SCZ requiring a corresponding paradigm shifting name. However,
evidence from a 2002 name change in Japan supports a reduction in stigma and prejudiced
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attitudes, particularly by young people toward those with what is now labeled as “integration
disorder”10 (Sato, 2017).
An even more radical perspective could favorably compare SCZ to autism spectrum
disorder in several important ways. Though both have distinctly different courses and
manifestations, there is also a healthy degree of conceptual, neurodevelopmental, and genetic
overlap (Crespi, Stead, & Elliot, 2010; Konstantareas & Hewitt, 2001). It seems the underlying
neurobiology of both begins prenatally. Therefore, capacity for both appear to exist from birth
though present on different timelines. Clinical manifestations of autism usually become obvious
at a very young age. Symptoms associated with SCZ might not be debilitating, or even obvious,
until early adulthood, but that doesn’t mean the onset is as sudden as it appears. Both are highly
heterogeneous regarding symptoms. Neither appears to be necessarily progressive, particularly
with adequate resources and social support.
A growing disability rights movement called Neurodiversity stresses the idea that
conditions such as autism, ADHD, and SCZ are not disorders, but fit along the long tail of
human development variability (Baron-Cohen, 2017)—essentially a “spectrum” within a
spectrum. People vary in height, intelligence, and the so-called big five personality traits;
neurodiversity proposes that people also naturally vary in sensory sensitivity and social
cognition. The movement calls for abandoning the idea that people with autism can be “cured”
with a yet to be discovered pharmaceutical. Instead, people with autism should be appreciated as
having strengths and challenges worth supporting, not only in the name of equality, but for their
potential to contribute to society in meaningful ways. Stigma toward those with autism hasn’t
been erased, but support for autism does appear to have taken center stage in ways that SCZ has

10

See p.64 for discussion of the name change to “integration disorder” in Japan.
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not. There has been a large movement to develop educational programs, technological aides, and
products to assist people with autism meet their challenges.
Just as autism might be best placed on the long tail of the normalized distribution of
human variability instead of pathologized, people with the vulnerability to exhibit psychotic
symptoms might be best conceptualized on the opposite end of that long tail. If this is the case,
seeking a “cure” for SCZ might be redirected toward increasing social support. Recognizing that
all people have the capacity to hallucinate or subscribe to delusional beliefs from time to time,
research and interventions could focus on harm reduction, CBT, and other psychosocial
interventions that include families to cope with and manage symptoms. People prone to
psychotic symptoms should not be left to fall through the cracks and suffer from social and
structural discrimination. People that experience hallucinations and delusions could be
considered “the dreamers” in our culture and valued for their perspective and insights. Our
society does a great disservice by not considering them worthy of human rights.
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THE NATURE OF STIGMA
Stigma is a consensus-derived identifier of membership to a specific group as “morally
polluted” (“Stigma,” 2003). The word stigma comes from ancient Greek and was adopted into
Latin, before being reborn in English during the late sixteenth century. The word originally
described a “mark” made from either a pointed instrument or heated brand; therefore stigma is
equivalent to a tattoo left by a puncture in the skin or a brand on the skin from heated iron. The
term was associated with the branding of slaves, criminals, or traitors to signify that they are to
be shunned or avoided. During the middle ages, the term came back in vogue with a strong
association to the wounds left on Christ’s body from crucifixion. Sociologist Erving Goffman
(1963) applied the term “social stigma” to denote disapproval of a person or group that differs
from the cultural norms. Goffman identified three forms of social stigma: obvious physical
deformations such as physical disability; “tribal stigmas” such as being from a non-dominant
ethnicity or religion; and deviations in personal traits such as being unemployed, having an
addiction, being a single parent, or experiencing psychological disorder. Therefore, the meaning
of stigma was expanded by Goffman from physical to also figurative marks which deeply
discredit a person for their deviance from what is considered “normal” in our culture. What is
considered normal is dictated by the dominant group holding the most power in society.
Patrick Corrigan, a psychologist at the Illinois Institute of Technology, appears to be the
leading researcher of stigma’s effects on people with mental illness. His name is attached to
hundreds of articles and chapters since the 1980s. Corrigan has written with a passionate pursuit
to unravel the complexities and nuances of stigmatization and how to change it. He frames
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stigma an issue of social injustice deeply embedded in all levels of societal structure (Corrigan,
2005b; Corrigan & Bink, 2016).

What is the boundary between mental illness and “normal”?
Corrigan (2005a) lists reasons why the boundary between mental illness and normal
remains “fuzzy.” He cites a 20% prevalence rate for psychological disorder considered “serious
mental illnesses.11” This proportion of one-fifth is of a large enough magnitude that mental
illness should not be considered rare or as distressing only a small minority of the population.
Also, many of the characteristic symptoms of these illnesses such as depression and anxiety are
common to most people, though to a lesser degree. Specific to psychosis, Strauss (1969) found
hallucinations and delusions to exist on continua; van Os, Hannssen, Bijl, and Ravelii (2000)
found these experiences also exist (albeit to a much lesser extent) in the general population. It is
well known that sleep deprivation can lead to hallucinations and religious beliefs can be
considered delusional to people outside that religious group. Both hallucinations and delusions
can be temporarily induced through LSD and psilocybin mushrooms. In many cultures, hearing
dead relatives’ voices is considered normal (Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009).
A behavioral symptom of a poor person’s disorder might look a lot like a rich person’s
eccentricity. Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) point out that psychiatric diagnoses are
unavoidably influenced by cultural mores and societal values. One glaring example is the fact
that homosexuality was only excluded as a mental disorder in the DSM-III (APA, 1980) due to
the tireless fight by gay activists to normalize homosexuality in the eyes of society. Nothing
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In the literature, such as Corrigan (2002), “major mental illness” and “serious mental illness” tend to be
synonymous and include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression.
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about the nature of homosexuality changed; it was society’s slow shift in acceptance of
homosexuality that privileged a move from the category of abnormal to normal. Currently,
transgender people rage a similar battle to be considered “normal” and free of pathology.
Mental illness and the concept of normal versus abnormal are best understood as social
constructions. These concepts are not descriptions of objective reality. Rather, they are defined
by social consensus. As Marecek and Hare-Mustin (2009) explain, language highlights certain
features of objects, situations, and relationships, thereby constraining and influencing our
experience of reality. Therefore, normal and abnormal are not based on objective measure. They
are used in a way that suggests a spectrum, yet the boundary between them is arbitrarily open to
shifts in societal beliefs.
Frances (2013) wrote a book length rant, Saving Normal, about DSM-based diagnosis
from his perspective as a former member and lead of the DSM-III–DSM-IV-TR task forces. He
believes that mental disorders should be diagnosed only when the presentation is clear, severe,
and not likely to resolve with time or from a change in lifestyle. He describes how the DSM
began with a goal of cataloging disorders to enhance research and as a guide for professionals. It
was not intended for the DSM to became the arbiter of who is considered normal, who is eligible
for insurance benefits, and who is considered a criminal in our society. Frances refers to
“diagnostic inflation” as a major concern, as the quantity of disorders have swollen from 106 in
the DSM-I (APA, 1956) to 300. This inflation has led to the stunning realization that nearly half
of all Americans will have a diagnosable mental illness during their lifetime (Rosenberg, 2013).
By trying to be more in-line with the medical model, the DSM has pathologized conditions of
living in a stressful society; pharmaceutical companies advertise quick and easy solutions to
these problems rather than lifestyle changes or learning coping and emotional regulation skills.
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What is the process of stigmatization of people diagnosed with
schizophrenia?
Research into the process of stigmatization has largely occurred within the disciplines of
social psychology and sociology. All minority groups are stigmatized to some extent and there is
a deep historical catalog examining the effects of stigma on people of color, nontraditional
sexual and gender orientation, women, immigrants, refugees, the poor, and people with mental
illness.12 Stigma can be divided into several types. Public stigma is applied by society toward the
stigmatized group. Self-stigma is the stigmatized individual’s belief that they fit the stereotype of
the label (Corrigan & Bink, 2016).
Stereotypes are socially constructed categorical descriptions, or commonly held beliefs,
or consensus “facts,” about a package of traits shared by a group of people. To make quick
decisions and conserve cognitive energy, humans rely on efficient patterns of mental processing
reinforced by prior experience. If they do not have much direct positive experience with people
outside their ingroup, they come to rely on the more familiar ingrained stereotypes transmitted
through media, society, and culture. Though some stereotype traits can be positive (e.g., the
stereotype that Asian-American students are good at math), negative evaluations are more
common. Since stereotypes apply to groups, nuance of the individual is lost to the category.
Stereotypes are usually understood to be inherent to all members of the group with exceptions
viewed as rare; if someone is perceived as failing to fit the stereotype of their group, they are
often considered of a different category called “exceptional.”

12

The terms “mental illness,” “mental disorder,” and “psychological disorder” are used interchangeably
in the literature. These terms should be considered stigmatizing as they connote “abnormality” and in turn
infer a judgement of value on people with variable traits. They also tend to be pluralized as
“psychological disorders” but this contributes to reification (see p.5 for discussion of reification).
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To put it bluntly, most people have a deep fear of losing their mind – to lose control of
their own thoughts and behaviors. SCZ represents this fear in it’s very name, which translates to
“a mind that is torn asunder” (Lavretsky, 2008). SCZ is poorly understood by most people and
popular understanding tends to come from media examples (Wahl, 1995) dominated by real and
fictional people that have lost control of their minds and behaved in inexplicable and terrifying
ways (e.g., serial and spree killers, paranoid conspiracy theorists, and lone men arguing with
themselves as they wander the city streets). Therefore, commonly held stereotype traits about
SCZ include dangerousness, unpredictability, incompetence, inability to care for themselves,
childlike, immoral, and responsible for their condition (Corrigan & Bink, 2016; Corrigan &
Kleinlein, 2005).
Stereotypes of social groups are deeply embedded in our social structure, yet are not
necessarily endorsed by everyone. Prejudice is the belief that stereotypes accurately reflect a
social group; holding prejudice tends to generate negative emotional reactions toward members
of the outgroup such as fear and anger (Corrigan & Kleinlein, 2005). These beliefs ultimately
lead to a denial of life opportunities such as access to mental health resources (Link & Phelan,
2001). In the case of SCZ, fears of unpredictability and dangerousness often lead to avoidance by
others, or a desire for greater social distance (Martin, Pescosolido, & Tuch, 2000; Markowitz,
2005).
Discrimination is the behavioral reaction to prejudiced beliefs and can take many forms
from overtly aggressive and hostile behavior by individuals to subtle and insidious systemic
social and political policy. For example, employers may fail to hire a person with a history of
psychological disorder (Link, 1987) and landlords may refuse to rent an apartment to a person
with psychological disorder (Page, 1995). There is as a long shameful history of segregation of

REDUCING STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA

31

patients in mental hospitals, which has shifted since the 1970s to modern urban mental health
ghettos: low-income housing, homelessness, and prisons. Also, discrimination may lead to public
endorsement of coercive treatment and forced medication (Corrigan & Bink, 2016; Pescosolido,
Monahan, Link, Steuve, & Kikuzawa, 1999). Having a serious mental illness in the U.S.
essentially means to be a criminal guilty of moral failure, worthless to contributing toward a
capitalist system outside of consuming expensive pharmaceuticals or generating revenue in
privately held prisons.

How does labeling and ambiguous behavior contribute to stigma?
Corrigan and Kleinlein (2005) identify four “signals” that induce stigmatizing attitudes
toward people with psychological disorder: psychiatric symptoms, social skills deficits, physical
appearance, and labels. The first three signals have a high potential for “false positives” or
misattributing someone as mentally ill when they may be eccentric, shy, from another culture, or
of different socio-economic conditions. Meanwhile, many people struggling with symptoms of
psychological disorder can conceal their condition, leading to “false negatives.” Therefore, the
first three signals are unreliable signals of mental illness and labeling is the key variable leading
to stigma (Link, 1987).
However, it is an oversimplification to say labeling leads to stigmatizing attitudes without
including the role of behavior considered to be “abnormal” (Gove, 1982). In response to
criticism about not including the role of behavior on stigma, Link, Cullen, Frank, and Wozniak
(1989) proposed a “modified labeling theory” to account for the interaction effect of a person
labelled as having a psychological disorder acting in ways that are considered unusual or
ambiguous to others. This compromise accounts for the roles of labeling and behavior in stigma;
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however, stigma is often induced by the label alone and so unusual behavior should be
considered sufficient, but not necessary for stigma.
Otatti, Bodenhausen, and Newman (2005) equate clinical diagnosis as a form of
stereotyping. By assigning a client to a diagnostic category, the client’s unique qualities are lost
to focus on their resemblance to the typical set of symptoms that characterize their membership
in the group (e.g., “schizophrenics hear voices and have bizarre beliefs”). Once a diagnosis has
been assigned, the clinician may become insensitive to the client’s unique set of symptoms,
strengths, and goals. Treatment strategies may be based on generalizations about the group rather
than the specific individual qualities of the client (e.g., “schizophrenics need antipsychotics to
suppress their symptoms”). Therefore, these researchers warn that diagnostic categories can lead
to biased preconceptions, default assumptions, and group-based expectations.
A few classic studies illustrate how labeling biases mental health professionals’
assessments of client behavior, particularly when the behavior is ambiguous. An often-cited
study of Rosenhan (1973) described a group of his undercover colleagues intentionally landing
themselves in psychiatric wards based on presenting a single ambiguous symptom—reporting an
internal voice repeating “empty,” “hollow,” or “thud.” Most of the actors were immediately
diagnosed with SCZ and hospitalized. Once hospitalized, the actors claimed to no longer hear a
voice and showed no further signs of disordered behavior. Upon their release, the actors were
still considered “schizophrenic,” but in remission. Langer and Abelson (1974) had
psychotherapists rate the psychological adjustment of a video-taped young man being
interviewed; half were told the young man was a “job applicant,” the rest were told he was a
“patient.” Despite having watched the same video, therapists who believed the man was a patient
viewed his behavior as more “disturbed” than those who were told he was a job candidate. A
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study by Sagar and Schofield (1980) looked at how people generally judge ambiguous behavior
by a stigmatized group. White participants watched a video of either a Black or White actor
poking another person with a pencil. This same ambiguous action was determined “hostile” by
the Black actor and “playful” when performed by the White actor. Ottati et al. (2005) conclude
from these studies that categorical labels influence what the perceiver believes regardless of the
data presented. Humans tend to interpret behavior with unclear intentions in biased ways that are
consistent with stereotypic generalizations.
Some people can conceal obvious signs of experiencing psychotic symptoms, but others
behave in ways that are considered bizarre because they range outside social norms. Ambiguous
behavior is often misconstrued as it makes other people feel uncomfortable. More importantly,
because a dominant stereotype of people labeled with SCZ is dangerousness, they risk trivial
actions interpreted by others as personally threatening. To complicate matters, the stereotype of
unpredictability amplifies other’s desire for greater social distance.

Is there evidence to support stereotypes about schizophrenia?
Ottati et al. (2005) clarify that stereotypes of mental illness are often inaccurate and
exaggerated. A nationwide survey found close to 75% of the public view people with mental
illness as “dangerous” (Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999b). However,
research by Steadman, Morris, and Dennis (1998) found no association of violence and mental
illness when focused on individuals free of substance abuse. As Link et al. (1999a) conclude, the
risk of violence by people with psychological disorder is comparable to the risk of violence by
young males in general. As Watson, Ottati, Lurigio, and Heyrman (2005) re-state, “Individuals
with mental illness are commonly no more dangerous than the typical teenager” (p.202).
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Meanwhile, people struggling with symptoms of SCZ are at great risk of victimization,
particularly by criminals and the police.13
Labels of psychological disorder such as SCZ are automatically and unfairly linked to
ingrained beliefs associated with violence induced by ubiquitous stereotypes. High profile media
examples abound of people labeled with SCZ acting inexplicably and committing horrific acts as
opposed to stories highlighting remission, resilience, and coping. Availability bias is a heuristic
where people make rapid judgments based on how effortlessly an example comes to mind
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In the case of hearing the word “schizophrenia,” popular
examples are overwhelmingly antisocial and so associations are largely negative. Meanwhile,
each new instance of media portrayal of SCZ associated with violence provides corroborating
evidence to support and reinforce the belief, which is another heuristic referred to as
confirmation bias (Wason, 1968).
It would be naïve to claim that people experiencing cognitive symptoms associated with
SCZ have no capacity for acting in violent ways, but rather the potential for dangerousness is
grossly over exaggerated, assumed to be inherent, and too readily misattributed as caused by
SCZ. There are certain patterns of paranoid delusion that are more associated with violent
behavior, but when violence happens, the cause is better attributed to a complex interaction of
persecutory delusions, substance abuse, inadequate treatment, and systemic oppression.
Therefore, societal concern about dangerous behaviors associated with SCZ should invest in
unraveling the underlying factors that do contribute to violence and suffering.

13

See p.48 for discussion of the criminalization of mental illness and discrimination by the police.

REDUCING STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA

35

How have public reactions to mental illness changed over time?
People tend to believe prejudice and discrimination are historical problems which have
improved with education and public knowledge (Corrigan & Kleinlein, 2005). Dreadfully, the
public’s perceptions of persons with psychological disorder have worsened over the last century.
Toward the conclusion of the 1990s, Phelan, Link, Stueve, and Pescosolido (2000) followed up a
survey of public beliefs about persons with psychological disorder originally conducted by Star
(1952). Phelan and colleagues found the proportion of people who associated psychological
disorder with violence had nearly doubled since the 1950s. The association with violence was
particularly robust when those surveyed quickly thought of psychotic behavior as an example of
“mental illness.” Furthermore, those surveyed expressed a desire for greater social distance from
those with psychological disorder: They were less willing to live near, socialize with, or work
alongside people with psychiatric disorders; they did not want a group home for the “mentally
ill” nearby; nor did they want a person with psychological disorder to marry into their family. In
a separate study, Pescosolido et al. (1999) found more than 40% of respondents believed persons
with signs of psychotic symptoms should be forced into treatment. Discussing this research,
Markowitz (2005) declares it a paradox that “public understanding of mental illness has
apparently increased, yet the perception of persons with psychotic disorders as being dangerous
has also increased” (p.136). Apparently, education is not enough to reduce prejudiced beliefs
toward those with stigmatized psychological disorder.
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What other factors contribute to stigma toward those considered
“schizophrenic”?
Phelan et al. (2000) conclude that more people empathize with conditions such as
depression, yet devalue SCZ as something that happens to people outside their ingroup. This
double standard may ascend from the relatability of depression, as despair and lack of motivation
affects most people from time to time. However, behaviors associated with SCZ appear alien and
terrifying to those who don’t recognize that all people also have the capacity to experience minor
delusional beliefs and perceptual hallucinations from time to time (van Os et al., 2000).
Ottati et al. (2005) also explain the role of the just world hypothesis, a phenomenon
originally described by Lerner (1980). Each person orients their perspective to the world in
relation to their self, and tend to believe their ability to cope is due to their own personal
strength. Believing in one’s own resiliency is healthy. However, there is an accompanying
assumption14 that “the world is a fair place” and therefore “people tend to get what they
deserve.” This argument is an extension of deep-seated puritanical religious beliefs ingrained in
our culture. In other words, those who work hard, resist temptation, deny impulsive behavior,
and act morally obtain positive outcomes; bad things happen as punishment for the sin of moral
failure. An experiment to specifically test the effects of perceiving a “just world” found a strong
correlation of endorsing this belief with an increased tendency to blame victims for having
contracted a sexually transmitted disease and they chose to withhold help and support for these
people (DePalma, Madey, Tillman, & Wheeler, 1999). From the just world perspective, a
homeless person might be judged as having chosen to live on the street, or because of their own

14

Ironic, as people with psychotic symptoms may lack the insight to understand their beliefs as delusions,
Lerner (1980) referred to the common assumption of a just world as “the fundamental delusion.”
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moral failings (e.g., laziness). Conversely, people with delusional beliefs could be discounted as
too stubborn to seek or stick to treatment, or due to character flaws or inadequate parenting.

What impact does public stigma have on people with psychological
disorder?
Generally, those with psychological disorder have the same life goals as those free of
cognitive and/or physical disabilities. Corrigan and Kleinlein (2005) list these goals as obtaining
competitive employment and living independently in a safe and comfortable home.
Unfortunately, these researchers report less than 15% of people with serious mental illness are
employed. Sturm, Gresenz, Pacula, and Wells (1999) declare unemployment rates among
persons with psychological disorder to be three to five times higher than the rest of the
population. Willis, Willis, Male, Henderson, and Manderscheid (1998) examined data from the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) to find more than 60%
of people with mental or emotional problems are unemployed and nearly a quarter of this group
live below the poverty level. They found most Americans considered “long-term mentally ill”
reside in inadequate housing, lack needed support, or are homeless. One significant challenge is
that those with psychological disorder must often compete for housing with other low-income
groups considered to be more suitable tenants (Carling, 1990).
Rössler, Salize, van Os, and Reicher-Rössler (2005) review reasons SCZ is considered
one of the top-ten most burdensome and costly disabling illnesses worldwide. Life expectancy is
reduced by approximately 15–20 years, and not because SCZ itself is lethal. The high mortality
is primarily due to suicide. Reduced health is common in this population, whether from chainsmoking cigarettes, high rates of obesity and diabetes, poor sleep, lack of exercise, accidents,
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and/or comorbid substance abuse and depression disorder. In addition to health problems, there
are substantial financial costs by way of treatment, hospitalization, and incarceration.

What are the effects of stigma on families of people with psychological
disorder?
Family and friends of those considered to have psychological disorder often suffer from
associative stigma (Mehta & Farina, 1988). As Angell, Cooke, and Novac (2005) explain, the
psychoanalytic approach has a long tradition in the U.S., which assumes mental illness is caused
by “problematic family dynamics.” This theory is particularly toxic because it leaves parents
feeling responsible for causing their child’s psychological disorder. In fact, only recently has
psychiatry turned away from the dominating theory that SCZ arises from the person’s mother
withholding affection. Even as formal theories of psychological disorder have been medicalized
and shifted away from blaming parents, this creed may be so deeply entrenched in our culture
that parents remain held at fault. Unfortunately, parents can be blamed even within a family,
leading fathers and mothers to blame each other. Friends of the family may also implicitly or
explicitly imply family dynamics to blame. When most vulnerable to the stressors of supporting
a struggling family member, parents and siblings often feel the weight of guilt, shame, and
alienation from friends and extended family. Conversely, many may deny, or fail to acknowledge
the symptomatic behaviors of their loved one. Wahl and Harman (1989) found self-esteem and
relationships among family members of those with psychological disorder tend to suffer. Phelan,
Bromet, and Link (1998) report associative stigma had worsened since the 1970s.
Castle and Morgan (2008) explain the role of “expressed emotion,” within the family
environment for the outcome of a person suffering psychotic symptoms. High levels of expressed
emotion include critical comments, hostility, and/or over-involved attitudes of family members.
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As can be expected, lower levels of expressed emotion are associated with better outcomes for
the person (Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998). As Rössler et al. (2005) further review, relapse directly
correlates with the person’s social and emotional environment within the household and so the
family’s love, patience, and support is crucial to reaching and maintaining functional recovery.
Adherence to medication, family education, and family support can reduce rate of relapses from
50% to less than 10%.

What is the media’s contribution to stigma?
A person identified as having schizophrenic symptoms reports their media-based
associations prior to being diagnosed:
“All I knew were the stereotypes I had seen on television or in the movies. To
me, mental illness meant Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, psychopathic serial killers,
loony bins, morons, schizos, fruitcakes, nuts, straight jackets, and raving
lunatics. They were all I knew about mental illness, and what terrified me was
that professionals were saying I was one of them” (Deegan, 1997, p. 371).
Echoing this sentiment with extensive analysis of popular television and movies, Wahl
(1995) found media uncritically depicts persons with serious psychological disorder as fitting
stereotypes of dangerousness, unpredictability, and incompetence. This means audiences are
selectively exposed to a biased sample of terrifying characters with psychological disorder As
mentioned earlier, this selective exposure nurtures an availability-bias heuristic—a default
association of mental illness with fear. Consequently, a person primarily exposed to
representations of people with mental illness as “crazed killers,” “incompetent children,” or
“rebellious spirits” (Wahl, 1995; Hyler, Gabbard, & Schneider, 1991) can be expected to feel
apprehensive about interacting with people labeled “schizophrenic.”
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Major news sources are the primary way the public learns about mental illness and these
media largely reinforce the stereotype of dangerousness associated with SCZ. Vahabzadeh,
Wittenauer, and Carr (2011) compare stigmatizing descriptions of SCZ in U.S. newspapers from
the year 2000 to 2010. Despite finding a significant decrease in reporting on crime committed by
people with symptoms of SCZ, there was no change in rates of stereotyping people with
schizophrenic symptoms as dangerous criminals. Though journalists generally endorse the goal
to be fair and unbiased in their reporting, capturing readers’ attention with sensational headlines
tends to trump nuanced descriptions of people with psychological disorder (e.g., “KnifeWielding Woman Suffered From Schizophrenia”) (p.444). They found 60% of human interest
articles in 2010 about SCZ focused on crimes committed by people exhibiting psychotic
symptoms; nearly 75% of those articles were about murders by people believed to have SCZ.
Even though people with indicators of SCZ are far more likely to be victims of crimes, only
1.6% of the articles reported on their victimization. They found no change over the decade in
using the terms “schizophrenia” and “schizophrenic” as metaphors for illogical behavior or “split
personality” (e.g., “Audiences are really schizophrenic…”) (p.444).

What role do mental health professionals play in stigma?
Angell et al. (2005) reveal the surprising tragedy that mental health professionals often
hold pejorative attitudes toward people with psychological disorder. Psychiatry has a long
history of coercive treatment approaches that infantilize their patients and assume low
expectations for recovery, which has contributed to the deep structural stigma persisting today.
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Mental health professionals have their own type of availability bias, or clinician’s illusion15
(Harding and Zahniser, 1994), where pessimism about recovery arises from more frequent
exposure to statistically less common chronic disorders and/or cases of less functional then
average people with psychological disorder. This skewed bias of extreme cases results in
prejudiced attitudes and discrimination by way of paternalistic and coercive treatment strategies
(Angell et al., 2005). Mental health professionals too often communicate to their patient, or to
that person’s family, a pessimistic belief that chances of functional recovery are unlikely. Since
mental health professionals are the people that are turned to for explanations of psychological
disorder and available treatments, their prejudice has significant impact.

What are consumer experiences of interacting with mental health
professionals?
Angell et al. (2005) inspect first-hand consumer reports of their experiences with the
mental health industry. Many report “lacking a voice” in their own treatment and recovery. Some
feel burdened over the implicit hopelessness of being referred to as “chronically mentally ill.”
Other patients express feeling “dehumanized” by professionals’ ignorance of the basic needs and
desires of people with psychological disadvantages as the same needs and desires as other human
beings. Another common occurrence is belittlement and/or being maligned as if childlike and
helpless. Some complain of a risk that asserting themselves can lead to being labeled “resistant”
or “non-compliant.” Numerous consumers report feeling presumed accountable for their
condition not improving; their inability to control their symptoms can be implicitly inferred as
evidence of their moral failure.

15

See p.47 for discussion of a similar unnamed phenomenon that effects police attitudes toward people
with psychological disorder.
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What is the process of people with psychological disorder internalizing
stigma?
Corrigan (1998) explains how most people living in our culture steeped in stigmatizing
beliefs are aware of the stereotypes and prejudice surrounding people with psychological
disorder.16 The degree to which a person diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder accepts these
stereotypes as true has a significant impact on their self-esteem, self-efficacy, and confidence in
their own future (see also: Corrigan & Calabrese, 2005; Holmes & River; 1998). Inconveniently,
many people soon develop self-prejudice when formally labeled with SCZ—a process referred to
as self-stigmatization (Gallo, 1994). The diagnosed person is usually acquainted with the
negative stereotypes associated with SCZ, and/or swiftly becomes aware the extent to which
people are prejudiced against the outgroup to which they’ve been assigned. Upon diagnosis, they
anticipate being devalued and rejected (Angell et al., 2005). As a type of self-fulfilling prophecy,
many people diagnosed with SCZ distance themselves from other people, pass on opportunities,
behave defensively, and experience a loss of self-esteem. Avoidance behaviors result in being
perceived as socially awkward and to social distancing by others (Link et al., 1987; Angell et al.,
2005).
Corrigan and Kleinlein (2005) explain the connection of self-prejudice leading to
negative emotional reactions including low self-esteem (personal worth) and low self-efficacy
(expectation that one can successfully cope with life demands). Self-prejudice, low self-efficacy,
and feeling demoralized strip motivation to pursue work or independent living opportunities
(Link, 1987), which Corrigan, Bink, Schmidt, Jones, and Rusch (2016) call the “why try” effect.

16

Some people with serious cognitive impairment are exceptions.
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Is internalized self-stigma inevitable?
The sanguine news about self-stigma is that it is not universal among all people in
stigmatized groups. Drawing from the sociology literature on how different stigmatized groups
(women, gay, Black, etc.) internalize prejudice, Corrigan and Watson (2002) recognize the
fundamental paradox of self-stigma, or fact that a substantial minority of persons respond to
stigma with psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966), where they explicitly oppose negative
evaluations. They may experience righteous anger (Chamberlin, 1978) over discrimination by
the public and mental health system. Positive self-impressions can emerge as they feel more
connected to a stigmatized community (Corrigan & Kleinlien, 2005). Rejecting self-stigma leads
some to affirming actions such as mutual empowerment and activism (Wright, 1997) and to
becoming more active participants in their treatment plan (Corrigan, 2002). Empowerment is
understood as the polar-opposite of self-stigma and therefore is associated with higher selfesteem, higher self-efficacy, and positive identity (Corrigan & Watson, 2002). This elevated selfimage can lead to advocating for better services and opportunities (Watson & River, 2005).
A less common, but not insignificant response to stigma is indifference (Hayward &
Bright, 1997). Whether a stigmatized person reacts with indifference or righteous anger seems
hinged on how comfortably that person identifies as a member of the stigmatized group
(Corrigan and Kleinlein, 2005). Those who highly identify as members of the group tend toward
righteous anger, positive identity, and positive self-perception (Watson & Corrigan, 2005;
Watson & River, 2005). These positive outcomes are good reason to disclose one’s status and
become actively involved with a community of people stigmatized for similar reasons.
One thing that is confusingly clear from the literature outlining stigma is that reactions to
becoming a member of a stigmatized group are complex and difficult to predict. Whereas one
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person may feel alienated and despondent over receiving a diagnosis, others may feel inspired by
their membership in a group, outraged by discrimination, and energized to advocate for social
change. Yet others can roam in and out of these states depending on their motivation and the
status of their interpersonal relationships. The application of stigma is socially determined,
therefore labile and flexible enough to be reduced, if not eliminated, through social change.

What role does context play in how people with psychological disorder
respond behaviorally?
Other researchers emphasize that self-esteem is domain-specific and can fluctuate based
on social context (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Stereotype threat (Steele, 1997) is a well-established
phenomenon in which a member of a stigmatized group struggles to perform in a situation where
a specific negative stereotype applies (e.g., the stereotype that women are incompetent at math
can result in emotional distress or disengagement when women are asked to demonstrate math
skills). Corrigan and colleagues (2001, 2003) suggest a similar style of stereotype threat
disengagement may account for some of the poor social functioning of persons labeled with a
psychological disorder (Corrigan & Calabrese, 2003; Corrigan & Holzman, 2001). Knowing the
public believes a stereotype such as, “schizophrenics are out of touch with reality” may lead
people labeled as such to not value “careful cognition” and appear disoriented or confused in
social interactions (Watson & River, 2005). This disengagement feeds into the cycle of selffulfilling prophecy by confirming the expectation by others that the person is incoherent or
disoriented.

REDUCING STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA

45

How does the interaction of psychological disorder and substance abuse
contribute to stigma?
Unfortunately, approximately half of people that qualify for a serious psychiatric
diagnosis such as SCZ also suffer from substance dependence (Mueser, Bennett, & Shner, 2016).
Substance use itself is considered a psychiatric disorder that is also highly associated with a
stereotype of violent behavior. Rasinski, Woll, and Cooke (2005) describe the “dual
stigmatization” of comorbid psychiatric disorders and substance dependence interaction, which
magnifies the potential for opportunity loss. Link, Struening, Rahav, Phelan, and Nuttbrock
(1997) found 70% of the men they studied with co-occurring psychiatric and substance use
disorders reported four or more types of rejection; 65% assumed most people would look down
on them. Recovery does not seem to lessen stigma, as these researchers also report stigma toward
these men had not changed a year following successful treatment for both conditions. Even
seeking recovery from substance use can be stigmatizing as a survey found 39% reported
experiencing shame or embarrassment about being in recovery and 37% reported concern that
others would find out they were seeking help for substance use (Rasinski, Wolli et al., 2005).

What role does self-stigma have in accessing mental health services?
Corrigan and Kleinlein (2005) explain how many people with symptoms of psychological
disorder choose to not pursue mental health services to avoid being labeled out of fear of
discrimination. According to one large study, only 60% of people that qualify for the DSM-based
definition of SCZ participate in treatment (Regier, Narrow, Rae, & Manderscheid, 1993).
Another study found severity of symptoms has no impact on how likely a person is to participate
in treatment (Narrow, Regier, Norquist, Rae, Kennedy, & Arons, 2000; Kessler, Berglund,
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Bruce, Koch, Laska, & Leaf, 2001). Sirey, Bruce, Alexopoulos, Perlick, Friedman, and Meyers
(2001) establish a direct relationship between stigma and adherence to treatment; the more
people feel the effects of stigma, the less likely they are to stick to treatment. These studies
indicate that many people who would be likely to improve from treatment either avoid or dropout of treatment specifically because of stigma. To counter-balance, one important factor that
does correlate with pursuing treatment is positive attitudes of family members (Greenley,
Mechanic, & Clearly, 1987).

How does a historical accumulation of stigmatizing attitudes lead to
structural stigma?
Corrigan and Kleinlein (2005) explain how stigma at individual levels (public and selfstigma) are only the tip of the iceberg and perhaps the more benign forms of social stigma.
Sociologists have documented how the historical accretion of U.S. economic and political
injustices based on discrimination have coalesced in abysmal structural stigma (Link & Phelan,
2001). Institutional policies arise from the explicit or implicit prejudice of people in positions of
power; structural stigma is the accumulation outcome of keeping stigmatized groups in a
subordinate position (Pincus, 1996). Pincus explains structural discrimination as being “race and
gender neutral in intent,” but having a negative impact on women and/or minorities. An example
of structural stigma toward people with psychological disorder include lack of parity between
mental health and general medical coverage (Feldman, Bachman, & Bayer, 2002). Benefits for
“physical” illnesses have substantially outweighed those for “mental” illness for as long as the
existence of medical insurance companies.17 This precedent has led to the unfounded assumption
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Even more perplexing, this lack of parity is out-of-sync with the widely accepted modern medical
model of psychiatric disorder as a biologically-based brain disease.
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that increasing benefits for mental illness would somehow diminish benefits for ailments
considered “physical.” Another example of structural stigma is the lower rate of federal money
allocated to mental health research (Link & Phelan, 2001).
Pincus (1996) points out the insidious nature of structural discrimination, as in many
cases it may not be illegal, nor explicitly intended to be discriminatory, rather it is “carrying on
business as usual” (p.192). Therefore, they emphasize a need to reexamine our fundamental
cultural assumptions and values to disentangle discrimination embedded in our social
organization. Obviously, this is no easy task, particularly in the case of SCZ’s century of
coercive and clearly abusive treatment modalities.
Critical psychologists discuss the blind-spot of the field of psychology focusing on the
experience of individuals without enough emphasis on the group within larger society (Fox et al.,
2009). It is straight-forward enough to identify ways for an individual to resist the effects of
stigma. However, many stigmatized people do not have the luxury or freedom to become
involved with social activism because of systemic oppression. As Marecek and Hare-Mustin
(2009) point out, social and political conservatism has practically decimated resources for federal
and state funds for mental health care. These reforms disproportionately harm racial and ethnic
minority groups, as well as those from impoverished backgrounds.
“Indeed, in the USA today, there are more mentally ill people in prisons than
in mental hospitals. Needless to say, as prisoners, they receive little or no
mental health care; moreover, prison conditions frequently exacerbate their
difficulties” (Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009, p.90)

What role do police and the criminal justice system play in stigma?
As previously mentioned, the clinician’s illusion describes how pessimistic and negative
attitudes can develop from frequent exposure to persons with more chronic than average
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syndromes. A similar bias applies to police officers, who are selectively exposed to a sample of
people in crisis or who have committed crimes. It is easy to appreciate how many factors,
including exposure to this selective sample, inadequate training, information overload, time
pressure, and being highly motivated to arrive at quick decisions in ambiguous situations exhaust
limitations in cognitive capacity and lead to category-based information processing (Fiske,
2000). As Watson et al. (2005) explain, police officers are likely to rely on group stereotypes
when judging or responding to a specific person with mental illness.
The long-term effect of structural discrimination has been the criminalization of mental
illness (Teplin, 1983). As Markowitz (2011) explains, prior to the deinstitutionalization
movement beginning in the 1970s, many people suspected of struggling with psychotic
symptoms would have been diverted to mental health programs such as psychiatric hospitals.
Widespread criticism of inhumane treatment by hospitals was supposed to push reform into
creating an infrastructure to treat people with chronic psychological disorder in the community.
However, the 1980s were ushered in by an obliteration of social resources by Ronald Reagan and
the Republicans, who declared a “war on drugs” and enforced “zero tolerance” crime policies
that continue to target stigmatized groups. Hospitals were essentially emptied to urban centers
followed by jails and prisons became increasingly the warehouse centers of people with serious
mental illness. As things currently stand in the U.S., people with serious mental illness are three
times more likely to be found in the criminal justice system than in hospitals18.
Lurigio and Harris (2007) claim that tougher drug laws are particularly responsible for
increased criminalization of mental illness due to the high rate of comorbid substance abuse.
Psychiatric treatment facilities have a notoriously horrifying history of coercive treatment,

18

See http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org
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neglect, and outright abuse (Harman, 2003). Outrage against this history has led to increased
rights for people to refuse treatment and to challenge the practice of mandated treatment (Lamb,
Weinberger, & Gross, 1999). On one hand, coercive treatment imposes on the autonomy of
individuals. On the other hand, lacking insight under certain themes of delusional psychotic
symptoms such as extreme paranoia and feelings of hopelessness make it difficult for some
people to make informed decisions about pursuing treatment. Concurrently, public hospital beds
have been reduced dramatically and access to community mental health services is limited
(Lamb et al., 1999). This complex interaction of increased criminality and decreased services
have resulted in many people remaining untreated even if they would prefer treatment.
Watson et al. (2005) refer to police as “the gatekeepers of both the criminal justice and
mental health systems” (p.197). Police are typically the first point of contact with the criminal
justice system for people with psychological disorder. Police are in the position to decide
whether a person will be referred to community services (if this option even exists in their
community) or arrested. People showing signs of serious psychological disorder are more likely
to be arrested (Teplin, 1984) and to spend more time in jail than people without signs of
psychological disorder (Steadman et al., 1995). People with serious mental illness represent 16%
of the U.S. prison and jail population (Ditton, 1999), many are untreated (Markowitz, 2011).
Furthermore, Watson et al. (2005) show how difficult it is for police to overcome
stereotype biases, as it requires the perceiver to possess all the following conditions: an
awareness that their initial judgment is biased; a motivation to correct for the bias; a capacity to
correct for the bias; and a correct estimation of the direction and amount of the initial bias. These
researchers referred to meeting these conditions as a “formidable challenge” for police officers.
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Arrigo and Fox (2009) point toward the “conflicting group values” of police as the root
of social problems such as mistreatment of people with psychological disorder. Watson et al.
(2005) explain how “police culture” was found (in Manning, 1995) to be characterized by
conservatism, cynicism, authoritarianism, emotional detachment, secrecy, suspiciousness, social
isolation, group loyalty, an “us” versus “them” orientation toward citizens, and aggressive
policing style. They point out that it was once believed these traits were associated with a distinct
“police personality” of people attracted to the occupation, but these traits may result as a reaction
to occupational stress and/or are not generalizable among police officers. Ultimately, police are
people and so are varied and too complex to be generalized.
Regardless of how common authoritarian and social dominance personality traits are
among police, they are often in high-pressure situations that demand rapid life-or-death
judgments. Fearing for their own safety leaves little motivation to err on the side of cautious
compassion. Watson et al. (2005) explain how ambiguous behavior by those with psychological
disorder can easily be mistaken by police officers as aggressive. Police also tend to view people
with psychological disorder as untrustworthy, lacking integrity, incompetent, and unable to
provide reliable information. In addition to dangerousness and unpredictability, these stereotypes
result in police being more likely to arrest a person with mental illness rather than refer them to
mental health services. When people with psychological disorder report being victims of crimes,
they are often treated dismissively. Police also may feel unrewarded for the extra effort required
to refer or transfer people to mental health services rather than arresting and holding them in jail.
Complications with health insurance and the bureaucracy of medical facilities prohibits officers
from easily referring people to treatment centers. And finally, police typically receive inadequate
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training for identifying distinct types of disorder and in methods to deescalate psychological
crises.
A rare attempt to offer direct primary responder support to police interaction with people
experiencing mental health crises is Portland, Oregon’s Behavioral Health Response Team
(“Behavioral Health Unit,” n.d.). The Behavioral Health Response Team pairs professional
mental health professionals with police as they contact people in the community. This program
began in 2013 after an investigation of the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) found, “reasonable cause to believe that PPB engages in a pattern or practice of
unnecessary or unreasonable force during interactions with people who have or are perceived to
have mental illness” (DOJ, 2012). The PPB have a particularly heinous history of abusing and
killing people with mental illness, including the high-profile incident of three officers beating
James Chasse, a young man diagnosed with SCZ, to death in 2006 (“United States v. City of
Portland,” 2017). However, even since 2013, members of the PPB have killed at least ten other
people with serious psychological disorder including a homeless man in his fifties and a Black
teenager in February of this year (Brown, 2017). There has yet to be a thorough analysis of
whether the Behavioral Health Response Team has been overall effective in reducing
mistreatment by the PPB.
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STIGMA REDUCTION
Why and how to foster personal empowerment?
Rappaport (1987) explains that in a therapeutic context, being empowered means having
control over one’s treatment and life. Corrigan and Calabrese (2005) define personal
empowerment as the opposite of self-stigma. They claim empowered persons can be expected to
have high self-efficacy and self-esteem, to not feel overwhelmed by their symptoms or
psychiatric label, to have a positive outlook, and to take an active role in their recovery. One
challenge for approaches to empowerment is that they require active involvement of the client.
However, empowerment can be nurtured by granting the consumer greater control over their
treatment. Collaborative approaches to therapy emphasize strengths and the potential of the
consumer; research has found programs that include the client in all facets of treatment show
better outcomes to vocational and independent living goals (Corrigan, Faber, Rashid, & Leary,
1999; Corrigan & Garman, 1997).
Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) (Stein & Test, 1980), brings services to the
consumer’s home or workplace with moderate to good effects found on reducing
hospitalizations, increasing housing stability, shrinking symptoms, and improving quality of life
(Mueser, Bond, Drake, & Resnick, 1998). Supported employment and education approaches
empower clients through ongoing support, rather than merely preparing the client for school or
work (Corrigan & Calabrese, 2005). Other approaches that foster empowerment are volunteer
clubhouse community centers where participants are considered “members” rather than
“patients” and take an active and equal role as the supporting staff and vote on clubhouse
decisions (Fountain House, 1999).

REDUCING STIGMA ASSOCIATED WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA

53

What role does personal disclosure of psychological disorder have for
lessening stigma?
Compared to other stigmatized groups such as those based on race and gender, distinct
features of SCZ may not be noticeable to others. Corrigan (2005a) wrote a chapter to explain the
complicated benefits and drawbacks of a person with psychological disorder disclosing their
status to others publicly and privately. Since the definition of “disclosure” and comparative costs
and benefits remains unclear in relation to psychological disorder stigma, Corrigan looks to
parallel experiences of disclosure in the gay and lesbian community19 (Corrigan, 2005a). The
process of “identity development” for people with psychological disorder can be like the
experience of many gay and lesbians in their coming to terms with their status leads to sensing
the risk of being alienated from the “normal” population for disclosing their status. Revealing
one’s status as gay or lesbian or having psychological disorder carry risks of being discriminated
against, though in many different and some similar ways. Benefits to disclosure include
abatement of stress from keeping their status secret and hence more satisfying interpersonal
relationships. Coming out can lead to greater support from friends, family, and their respective
communities. However, whereas evidence clearly supports the overwhelming benefits of coming
out as gay or lesbian, much more research is needed to determine the full cost benefit analysis of
disclosing one’s status as experiencing symptoms of SCZ.

19

Comparing stigma associated with psychological disorder to stigma associated with the gay and lesbian
community is somewhat delicate as homosexuality was considered a mental disorder until 1980. Corrigan
(2005a) lists the differences and similarities of these groups to make the central point that both differ from
stigma associated with race or gender in that status can often be concealed until the individual chooses to
disclose. Also, people with psychological disorder frequently are not aware of their status until
adolescence/emerging adulthood, which is the case for many people coming to terms with their identity as
including being gay or lesbian. Both groups have a great deal of variability and in many other ways they
cannot be meaningfully compared.
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What are the effects of reappropriation of stigmatizing labels?
Refusing to use stigmatizing labels is just one approach to lessening stigma. Corrigan
(2005a) describes a more aggressive action taken by some charismatic individuals to
reappropriate stigmatizing labels as a source of pride (e.g., the term “queer” was once considered
pejorative but is now widely accepted as an umbrella term to include all non-heterosexual
groups). Those who reclaim labels may be empowered by righteous anger to reject stigma and
openly identify with the label to signal their pride as members of the stigmatized group. There
are several benefits for label reappropriation, including enhanced self-esteem and disarming the
power of the term being used against the group. Expressing pride in membership implies the
belief that being outside the “norm” is not bad or necessary to hide. Reappropriation also shifts
the ostracizing aspects of the term away from harming an individual to acknowledging their
community’s shared experience and mutual support. An example of reappropriation among
people with psychological disorder is a social justice and human rights in mental health advocacy
group, MadNation. Naturally, reappropriation is not something that can be prescribed by a
mental health researcher, but must be instigated and chosen collectively by the group members.
Recently, there have been people considered to have autism expressing a preference to be
referred to as “autistic,” using identity-first language, which directly counters professional
emphasis on person-first language (Brown, 2011). People expressing this perspective claim to be
proud to identify as members of a group with similar perceptual experiences. Others have
lamented the dropping of the label “Asperger’s syndrome” from DSM-5 as they feel there is
considerably less stigma associated with being a member of this sub-group rather than as
members of the general umbrella of ASD (Giles, 2014; Lutz, 2013). Others express concern that
lumping Asperger’s into the ASD implies homogeneity when high-functioning and low-
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functioning syndromes require much different resources for support (Ben-Zeeve, Young, &
Corrigan, 2010). However, Ohan, Ellefson, and Corrigan (2015) conducted a study that implies
dropping the name has not impacted stigma.
Many people report feeling relief when initially diagnosed with a disorder for the primary
reasons that they now have a word to describe their experiences and the knowledge that they are
not alone in having these experiences (Mental Health America, n.d.). However, reappropriation
of stigmatizing labels is a complex issue. There does not appear to be evidence to support strong
benefits for people with psychological disorder to self-identify with a pejorative label, such as
referring to themselves as “schitzo,” “crazy,” or “mad.”

What are strategies to challenge and change public stigma?
Corrigan and his colleagues have listed three strategies for changing stigma: Protest,
education, and contact (Corrigan & Bink, 2016; Watson & Corrigan, 2005; Corrigan, River,
Lundin, Penn, Uphoff-Wasowski, Campion et al., 2001; Corrigan & Penn, 1999). Each has
strengths, weaknesses and limited effects, though contact has the most robust support for
reducing stigma.
Protest strategies highlight the injustice of specific behaviors and take action by
shaming, boycotting, or appealing to the morality of prejudice and discrimination. Protest has
severe limitations in reducing stigma because shaming a person for their attitude can lead to a
rebound effect and inadvertently worsen prejudice (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten,
1994), perhaps due to psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). However, protest can change
specific behaviors, particularly if the protest has a financial impact (e.g., the National Alliance
for the Mentally Ill contributed to cancellation of a television show by publicly shaming its
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sponsors for advertising on a show reinforcing ignorance and stigma toward mental illness)
(Watson & Corrigan, 2005). Protest by way of public shaming and boycotting has become very
easy in the age of social networking websites, though positive outcomes are few and far between.
Educational strategies attempt to replace stereotypes and misinformation with “factual
information” about mental illness. There is some evidence that people with better understandings
of mental illness are less likely to endorse stigma and discrimination (Brockington, Hall,
Levings, & Murphy, 1993), and that education programs can produce short-term improvement in
attitudes (Corrigan et al., 2001). However, effects of educational strategies are limited. People
are not likely to change their beliefs over the long-run without significant motivation to
consistently inhibit default stereotypes with explicit cognitively controlled personal beliefs
(Devine, 1995). Stereotypes provide an energy conserving cognitive template heavily reinforced
by confirming “evidence,” and require a great deal of mindful awareness of counter evidence to
consistently reject the stereotype. Therefore, if a person has endorsed a stereotype that people
labeled with SCZ are dangerous from watching decades of stigmatizing movies and television
shows, they may be only temporarily influenced by learning a fact such as: individuals with
mental illness are no more dangerous than the general population (Watson and Corrigan, 2005).
Subsequent information, such as a sensationalized news story about a person with mental illness
committing a violent crime, is likely to reactivate and reinforce the original dangerousness
stereotype. This belief has been deeply ingrained and becomes easily reactivated with the newly
confirming evidence provided by the stigmatizing news report (Fyock & Stangor, 1994).
Contact strategies are the most effective, yet most challenging to facilitate. They consist
of interpersonal contact between the public and members of the stigmatized group (Corrigan et
al., 2001). Contact interventions are more complicated than originally conceptualized by Allport
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(1954/1979), who suggested that interacting with members of an outgroup reduced prejudice. To
reduce stigma effectively, it is preferable that the meeting occurs face-to-face in a formal work or
organizational setting (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). The stigmatized group member(s) should
present themselves and their story in a way that gently disconfirms the stereotype and focuses on
their successes and optimism for recovery (Watson & Corrigan, 2005). However, the presenter
should not come across as so atypical of prevailing stereotypes that they risk being judged as
special exceptions and disassociated from the stigmatized group (Watson & Corrigan, 2005).
Based on a meta-analysis of 44 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) found “optimal”
contact interventions require four elements to be most effective at reducing prejudice:
1. Equal status between groups.20 Neither group should be in charge or occupy a higher
status, as opposed to typical contact between power groups (e.g., doctor-patient, landlordresident, employer-employee).
2. Common goals. Both groups should work toward the same objective (e.g., solving a
neighborhood problem or collaborating on a community project).
3. No competition. The nature of the contact should be a mutual effort and not for one group
to out-perform the other.
4. Authority sanction for the contact. The contact intervention should be sponsored or
endorsed by management of an employment organization, or by community
organizations (e.g., the Board of Education, Better Business Bureau).

20

Here “group” is used in the social psychology context of ingroup (non-stigmatized persons) and
outgroup (stigmatized persons).
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How does the content of the message matter in anti-stigma campaigns?
Some researchers warn that biologically based disease explanations for mental illness
may reduce blame, while also provoking coercive and harsh treatment toward the person with
psychological disorder (Corrigan, Rowan, Green, Lundin, River, Uphoff-Wasowski et al., 2002;
Mehta and Farina, 1997). Many modern anti-stigma campaigns focus on biological explanations
for mental illness, such as NAMI’s “Mental Illness is a Brain Disease” campaign. Attributing
SCZ as a brain disease may make others more sympathetic toward the person’s suffering and less
likely to blame them for moral failure. However, putative biological explanations evoke pity
(sympathy), which activates benevolence stigma, or stereotypes of the person as childlike
(Brockington et al., 1993). As a result, the person is assumed to lack control of their behavior
which can reinforce the stereotype of unpredictability and potential for violence (Read & Law,
1999).
In contrast, psychosocial explanations reframe symptoms as inferred reactions to life
events by focusing on environmental stressors and trauma such as childhood abuse, poverty, and
job stress. These types of explanations appear effective for reducing beliefs of dangerousness and
unpredictability (Read & Law, 1999), and increasing positive images and reducing fear (Watson
& Corrigan, 2005). Psychosocial explanations are not perfect; some research suggests they
ignore important genetic and biological factors and increase blame toward the person with
psychological disorder or their family (Corrigan & Watson, 2004). The combined research on the
effects of biological explanations reducing blame but increasing fear and psychosocial
explanations reducing fear but increasing blame is a thorny problem requiring further research
and careful consideration on how to manage successful anti-stigma campaigns.
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A preliminary study by Corrigan, Schmidt, Bink, Niweglowski, Al-Khouja, Qin, &
Discount (2016) tests how the public responds to messages that include descriptions of positive
symptoms along a continuum of experience. Participants were exposed to various written
testimonials by people with symptoms of SCZ describing their condition either by listing their
symptoms like the DSM categorical approach, or by quantifying their symptoms. Statements
included: “I don’t always have symptoms, but when I do, I hear voices and sometimes believe
the CIA is investigating me;” “Most people get nervous in their daily lives;” and “Hallucinations
and delusions can happen to anyone when they are stressed.” (p.8). They found some effect on
reducing stigma in the readers, but the bigger effect was increased optimism for recovery. In a
recent editorial, Corrigan (2016) warns that more research is needed on whether messages that
promote the “normalcy” of mental illness symptoms is valuable to reducing stigma.
The public education approach, as introduced above, specifically contrasts stereotypes
with facts (e.g., violence prevalence rates) and shows mixed results. Corrigan et al. (2002)
conducted a study comparing educational approaches. One condition focused on dangerousness
by providing accurate information about violence prevalence rates. The other condition focused
on explaining causes and treatments of mental illness. Both conditions reduced perceptions of
dangerousness and decreased a desire for greater social distance. Yet the dangerousness
condition increased blame, whereas the causal treatment decreased blame. Thus, Watson and
Corrigan (2005) caution, “The goal of improving attitudes about mental illness in general is
laudable, yet too amorphous to achieve” (p.290). They recommend a targeted approach that
focuses on educating specific groups (e.g., employers, landlords, police officers, legislators, and
media executives) with a message crafted to tackle specific stereotypes with the “causal”
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explanation that would be most compelling for that group (e.g., addressing an employer’s
concern about incompetence).

Could a systems science approach to conceptualizing psychological
disorder help account for complexity?
A systems science approach to accounting for the multiple and interacting causes of
psychological disorder could overcome the limitations of reductionism, and of the unsatisfying
dichotomy between stigmatizing biological and psychosocial explanations. Hieronymi (2013)
explains that competence in systems thinking could be the key to understanding problems that
are “highly interlinked, complex and multidisciplinary” (p.580). As the approach suggests,
systems science is a field that is useful to examining complex structures with many interacting
variables to understand and potentially manipulate the behavior of the system as a whole. Classic
examples of complex systems include the weather, the brain, the economy, cities, and social
networks. As Mitchell (2011) explains in her book introducing systems science and complexity
theory, as more variables of the system are identified, operationalized, and quantified, the better
models can be designed to predict the emergent behavior of the system. Predicting the behavior
of dynamical systems (adaptive and constantly changing) is dependent on the initial condition.
Initial conditions of complex systems must account for all variables and are notoriously difficult
to measure precisely.
The central point of using systems science to conceptualize psychological disorder is that
it would honor the complex interaction of systems of variables contributing to disorder. Rather
than looking at the heterogeneity of a disorder like what we call SCZ as a problem, the
heterogeneity could be the inspiration for organizing the inquiry. Human behavior is especially
complex, as it emerges from the interaction of many complex systems, including a person’s
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brain, body, environment, family, culture, and social systems. These systems are dynamic and
behavior is also subject to moment-by-moment context. Systems science provides the template
for examining the variables of these systems in a way that is open to quantifying and using
mathematical modeling to manipulate variables to predict their effects on the system.

Could changing the diagnostic label of “schizophrenia” reduce stigma?
After a century of accumulated stigma associated with the name “schizophrenia,” the
question arises, could merely replacing the label to something different reduce stigma?
J. van Os (2009; 2013) is one of the leading U.S. proponents of changing the name of
SCZ. His reasons steer around changing societal stigma to aim at the parallel problem of
“iatrogenic stigma;” he explains that SCZ is a reified and misleading term based on century old
belief that SCZ is a disease. Furthermore, this “disease” has been characterized by the idea of
having a mind split from reality which is confusing, inaccurate, and not relatable to the public.
Most people can understand the nature of feeling depressed or anxious, or even what it means to
experience a hallucination or a belief not connected firmly to reality. He explains that SCZ is a
syndrome, or collection of symptoms, with dimensions that cluster together. He suggests the
label “salience syndrome21” to replace SCZ because of conceptual similarities to “metabolic
syndrome.” Considered a medical condition, metabolic syndrome is also a cluster of dimensional
symptoms that when aggravated in aggregate to certain levels, a threshold can be reached that
requires treatment for hypertension. Therefore, people with metabolic syndrome treat the
condition by minding a handful of physiological symptoms—blood pressure, blood sugar, excess

21

He explains, “salience is about how internal or external stimuli can become attention-grabbing and how
this, if it is not willed, can lead to perplexing experiences that result in a search for an explanation that are
subsequently recognized as delusions” (van Os, 2009, p.370).
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body fat, etc. Similarly, salience syndrome would describe a cluster of symptoms with varying
gradients that collectively push the threshold until the person has a psychotic episode.
One patient activist diagnosed with SCZ expresses distaste of “salience syndrome” as
George (2009) claims “salience” is “unfamiliar medical jargon” (p.467). He co-authors a followup article to explain the results of a competition to suggest a better name among his consumeradvocacy association members (George & Klijn, 2013). Out of 320 results, “dysfunctional
perception syndrome” was the winner, but quickly become contentiously criticized among some
members. They ended up choosing “psychosis susceptibility syndrome” as it appears sufficiently
descriptive and contains the idea that people with the syndrome are susceptible but not
guaranteed to experience a psychotic state. As people with direct experience of this syndrome,
they believe the name would reduce self-stigma.
Corrigan (2014) believes proposals to change the name of SCZ are missing the point and
he demands caution from seeking simple solutions. He states, “diagnostic relabeling as an
approach to stigma change entangles the issue in the medical perspective rather than freeing it
from psychiatry” (p.1263). Corrigan believes the people who suffer the stigma of the label
should lead the social change against the stigma, drawing parallels to Black empowerment
during the civil rights movement. All stigmatized groups have something in common, as
Corrigan suggests, it is not the label itself that stigmatizes people, but the fact that they are
considered other by the dominant group. The stigma arises from the shame associated with being
judged as different. His solution is empowerment because it replaces shame with righteous anger
and pride (self-worth) and is highly motivating for self-efficacy rather than succumbing to the
“why try” effect. Corrigan also warns that relabeling could be construed as an act of “political
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correctness” that would encourage virtue-signaling “word police” rather than diminishing
stigma.
However, what sort of alternative is there to amassing so much evidence of the harmful
effects of stigma, only to conclude that we must sit and wait for this group to revolt against our
shared power structures and demand their equal rights? Disability is not a problem of an “other”
group. Anyone can be physically disabled from an accident leading to paralysis, or an
environmental toxin leading to a cancer, or dementia in advanced age, or a concussion damaging
cognition and changing someone’s personality, or overwhelming depression from the
accumulation of hard luck and poverty.… Mental illness is something that happens to us,22
across our entire species, whether through atypical neurodevelopment or accumulation of stress
or traumatic childhoods. Some conditions, like symptoms associated with autism, arise early in
life, whereas conditions like dementia tend to arise later in life. For yet to be understood reasons,
SCZ tends to arise in the adolescence/middle of life. Stigma reduction should be a prominent
goal to all members of our society.
So yes, Corrigan’s (2014) editorial is aptly titled, “Erasing stigma is much more than
changing words.” He and his colleagues in psychology, sociology, and critical psychology all
agree that stigma is a deeply entrenched systemic problem requiring radical societal change. The
power structures are not motivated to change and will not do so at their own behest. Change will
require anyone willing and able to challenge the supremacy of the professional organizations of
psychiatry to demand equal rights and effective treatments. Pressure should be applied to cut off
pharmaceutical companies from rewarding mental health professionals for endorsing their
products, as well as the elimination of direct-to-consumer advertising and political lobbying
22

If serious mental illness effects approximately 23% of the population (Mueser et al., 2016) that’s no
small minority.
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influence. Police need to be trained on methods to deescalate mental health crisis situations. The
DSM should be shelved for its stigmatizing effect. If the DSM serves as the bible of psychiatry,
insurance companies, and the legal system, then rational blasphemy is necessary to disarm its
authority. Essentially, the entire system needs radical overhaul to make a significant difference
for human rights.
Changing the label of “schizophrenia” may be insufficient for immediate and total
elimination of stigma. However, as throwing out the baby with the bathwater is ill-advised,
disassociating the term from a condition defined a century ago could have small benefits that
accumulate over time. It might be naïve to assume that this action would have a large effect on
structural stigma, however it seems a baby step in a better direction.

What is the precedent for changing the label of “schizophrenia”?
Luckily, one does not have to merely speculate on the effects of changing the label of
“schizophrenia.” Japan changed the label in 2002 from Seishin-Bunretsu-Byo (mind-splitdisease) to Togo-Shitcho-Sho (integration disorder) and research is beginning to support its effect
on reducing stigma. As Sato (2017) explains, the intention of changing the name in Japan was
specifically to reduce stigma and to shift from the Kraepelinian tradition of assuming progressive
deteriorating illness with little chance of recovery. Japan moved to re-conceptualize SCZ based
on a biologically informed psychosocial vulnerability-stress model.
Japan has a different history than the U.S. with stigma of mental illness. The U.S. had its
heyday with eugenics informed policy in the early 1900s,23 which became a cultural taboo after

23

It is estimated that in the U.S., 64,000 people considered “genetically inferior” were sterilized in the
first several decades of the 1900s (Bouche & Rivard, 2014).
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the Nazis adapted the American idea to justify Germany’s state-sponsored genocide of Jews,
homosexuals, and people with physical or mental disabilities. Japan openly embraced a less
horrific, but still troubling version of eugenics until recently. A Japanese health education
textbook from 1970 is quoted in Koike, Yamaguchi, Ohta, Ojio, Watanabe, and Ando (2016):
In order to prevent inheriting especially malignant genetic disorders, mothers
who have genetic disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder can
abort the pregnancy by Eugenic Protection Act. (p.7).
Whereas the U.S. was experiencing a period of deinstitutionalization (and subsequent
lessening of mental health resources) in the 1980s, Japan moved in an opposite direction and
increased available psychiatric beds nearly 3-fold with the belief that people with schizophrenic
indications should be detained in the hospital long-term (Koike et al., 2016).
There is much evidence for optimism in Japan as Sato (2017) briefly reviews what has
been learned in the fifteen years since the name change. The new name has been widely accepted
by Japanese mass media, administration, and mental health professionals, as well as the people
diagnosed with the new title and their families. Prior to the name change, only 37% of patients
were informed of their diagnosis out of clinician concern over the impact of stigma—this
proportion rapidly doubled within two years, demonstrating reduced anticipation of rejection.
Patients have become more open about revealing their diagnosis to others and the anti-stigma
movement has rapidly grown and been promoted by persons in recovery. Clinical goals have also
shifted from a focus on remission to functional remission and recovery.
Koike, Yamaguchi, Yasutaka, Shimada, Watanabe, and Ando (2015) also examine the
long-term effects of the name change on reducing stigma in Japan. They found the university
students who filled out their survey knew more about, and had less negative stereotypes
associated with the new name—only 42% of the students were familiar with the old name,
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whereas 58% knew the new name. Those who reported personal experience with mental health
problems held even less negative stereotypes than the students who had no experience. Which is
another way to say both public- and self-stigma has been diminished.
Another study by Koike et al. (2016) surveys Japanese college students and their parents
to compare how stigma toward SCZ had changed between generations. As expected, their results
found parents were far more likely to recognize the old and new names as being the same
condition. Parents that did not recognize the names as the same condition associated fewer
negative stereotypes toward the new name. Overall, parents expressed greater stigma and desire
for social distance from people with schizophrenic symptoms than their children. The researchers
point out potentially confounding variables, such as substantial changes to educational
curriculum on mental illness and increased support in schools for mental health. From this study,
the researchers suggest a name change can reduce stigma in the long-run partially because
younger people grow up unaware of the previous label and stigma associated with the old name.
Aoki, Aoki, Kasai, Thornicroft, and Henderson (2016) examine how newspaper
portrayals of SCZ transformed from a decade before until a decade after the name change,
specifically in terms of the dangerousness stereotype. They discovered an upward trend of
articles associated with danger leading up to the name change, followed by a significant decrease
in the more recent decade. They used newspaper coverage of bipolar disorder as their control
variable, which had steadily increased in association with danger over this same 20-year period.
They believe newspaper coverage can be an index of wider public opinion. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to conclude that stigma and association of dangerousness with psychotic symptoms
had significantly decreased since the name change.
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Based on the short-term success of the name change, South Korea followed suit in 2012
(Lee, Kim, & Kwon, 2013) and Taiwan in 2014 (Sartorus, Chiu, Heok, Lee, Ouyang, Sato,
Yang, & Yu, 2014). Japan also changed the name of dementia from Chiho (idiocy and stupidity)
to Ninchi-sho (cognition disorder) in 2004 (Koike et al., 2015), suggesting the beginning of a
positive trend in helping people with psychological disorder lead more fulfilling lives with less
shame.
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CONCLUSION
Stigma associated with psychological disorder is a complex problem requiring a
sensitivity to complexity to resolve. Diagnostic labeling based on DSM categorization best serves
the pharmaceutical and insurance companies, not the people who struggle with disability. SCZ
was conceptualized a century ago as a progressive disease blamed on bad parenting and has
never recovered despite ample scientific evidence that functional recovery is likely through
evidence-based treatments for the individual and their family. Meanwhile, neuroscience and
genetics research have only reinforced how little is known about psychological disorder as there
are still no known mechanisms or biological markers for any psychiatric diagnosis. Despite
lacking answers, psychiatry made the conscious choice to re-conceptualize psychological
disorder based on a medical model to gain legitimacy as a science. This has only obfuscated the
problem through reification of disorder constructs as understood and solvable through
pharmaceutical interventions. Meanwhile, there has been no significant progress in antipsychotic
drugs used to treat SCZ for approximately 70 years and CBT for psychosis is largely underutilized despite evidence to support its efficacy.
The term “schizophrenia” is a relic from an era when scientists largely made guesses at
underlying biological problems based on observation of behavior and self-reported symptoms.
Unlike depression, which is relatable to the public, SCZ fills people with fear over the anxiety of
losing one’s mind or of being a victim of someone with unpredictable behavior. SCZ has been
maligned by the media as synonymous with raving lunatics and dangerous criminals. In addition
to the media, stigma of SCZ is reinforced by mental health professionals’ pessimistic attitudes
and the “mental illness is a brain disease” messages of most anti-stigma campaigns. The horrific
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conditions of psychiatric hospitals and asylums have been replaced by jails, prisons, poverty, and
homelessness. Portland, Oregon, may have more progressive programs to help people
experiencing mental health crises than many U.S. cities, but also has a police department found
by the U.S. Department of Justice to regularly use unnecessary and unreasonable force against
people with psychological disorder.
Social stigma is a significant obstacle that many people with disability are not able to
overcome. This partially explains why SCZ has an excessive mortality rate, including the highest
incidence of suicide of any disorder, even though SCZ itself is not lethal. Public stigma clearly
arises from the negative stereotypes of dangerousness and unpredictability associated with the
word SCZ. Structural stigma and discrimination are complex problems that would require a restructuring of our entire system to eradicate. However, there are little changes that can be
enacted to reduce stigma and move toward a more equal and just society. One small change that
could have some effect is simply changing the label to a term that is not associated with a
century of stigmatizing associations and is more descriptive of psychotic experiences that are
relatable to others. Japan chose “integration disorder” and has found success at reducing public
and self-stigma.
Changing the name is a step in the right direction along the way to integrating people
with psychological disorder as normal people with typical goals to live fulfilling lives with
meaningful employment, interpersonal relationships, to not have to writhe in poverty, or be
sequestered within the criminal justice system. Just as an industry has arisen to support the needs
of people considered to have autism, people considered to have SCZ should be given similar
opportunities to manage and soothe their troubling symptoms and not be ostracized as “other.”
No one is handing out human rights and so we must demand them.
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